A Review of FBI Security Programs

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flow of information inside the Bureau, a work ethic wholly at odds with the compartmentation characteristic of intelligence investigations involving highly sensitive, classified information. In a criminal investigation, rules restricting information are perceived as cumbersome, inefficient, and a bar to success. A law-enforcement culture grounded in shared information is radically different from an intelligence culture grounded in secrecy. The two will never fully co-exist in the Bureau unless security programs receive the commitment and respect the FBI gives criminal investigations. Even the latter, employing their own sensitive information and confidential sources, will benefit from improved security. The focus on criminal investigations as the core function of the FBI and the perception of those investigations as the surest path to career advancement has had an important consequence: operational imperatives will normally and without reflection trump security needs. For instance, senior Bureau management recently removed certain security based access restrictions from the FBI’s automated system of records, the principal computer system Hanssen exploited, because the restrictions had hindered the investigation of the terrorist attacks. This decision might make a great deal of sense operationally; however, it was made essentially without consulting the Bureau’s security apparatus. One result, surely unforeseen and unintended, was general access within the Bureau to information obtained through warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The use of that information in criminal investigations is tightly restricted by Constitutional considerations and Department of Justice guidelines. Highly classified FISA information, unidentified as to source and generally disseminated to FBI investigators, violates the basic security principle that such information should be circulated only among those who “need to know.” Operational efficiency is important, especially when our country might be under terrorist siege, and tightening controls on classified information will come with a cost to efficiency and resources. With this in mind and recognizing that we cannot eliminate intelligence efforts directed against us, the Commission attempted to recommend changes -2-
in FBI security programs that will minimize the harm those who betray us can do and shorten the time between their defection and detection. Accordingly, the recommendations we make are intended to address significant flaws in the process through which the Bureau generates and implements security policy and protocols for classified information. We believe that, if these recommendations are followed, a workplace culture will be established that recognizes security lapses as significant, restricts access to particular items of classified information to those who need them to perform their jobs, and makes disloyal employees more quickly visible. If these goals are met, the FBI will strike a sound balance between security and operational efficiency. To this end, we focused our investigation on four areas: the structure of the Bureau’s security programs and the policies and procedures designed to ensure the integrity of its personnel, information systems, and documents. An important component of our work consisted of gathering information about security organization in other agencies so that we could incorporate into our recommendations “best-practices” within the Intelligence Community. Other agencies have substantially enhanced the responsibility and visibility of their security programs within the past few years, often as a consequence of intelligence penetrations. Although the FBI has begun to take steps to improve security, senior management has not fully embraced the changes necessary to bring Bureau security programs up to par with the rest of the Intelligence Community. In general, FBI security programs fall short of the Community norm. To correct these deficiencies, the Bureau’s security function must be given stature, resources, and visibility, and Bureau senior management must commit to a security program as a core FBI function. Accordingly, our principal structural recommendation is that the FBI establish an independent Office of Security, led by a senior executive reporting to the Director, responsible for developing and implementing all Bureau security programs. The Office of Security must have the authority to take critical security issues to the Director and -3-
Page 1 and 2: U.S. Department of Justice A Review
Page 3 and 4: Commission for the Review of FBI Se
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary ........
Page 7: The Commission for the Review of FB
Page 11 and 12: Unlike other Intelligence Community
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
Page 15 and 16: un by an officer in the Soviet mili
Page 17 and 18: establishment, U.S. penetration of
Page 19 and 20: operatives he had exposed as double
Page 21 and 22: Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
Page 23 and 24: een transferred to FBI Headquarters
Page 25 and 26: Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
Page 27 and 28: Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
Page 29 and 30: others.” In calling for the estab
Page 31 and 32: have discovered in FBI security pro
Page 33 and 34: The following is a compressed compi
Page 35 and 36: I. Security Investigations And Adju
Page 37 and 38: DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
Page 57 and 58: On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
Page 59 and 60:
senior FBI officials responsible fo
Page 61 and 62:
percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
Page 63 and 64:
information security policies that
Page 65 and 66:
PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
Page 67 and 68:
The Commission conducted a detailed
Page 69 and 70:
The PSU is also responsible for adm
Page 71 and 72:
Unit for new applicants, the Person
Page 73 and 74:
various elements is spread througho
Page 75 and 76:
addressed. These interviews are ess
Page 77 and 78:
identified, these individuals can b
Page 79 and 80:
overextended and potentially at ris
Page 81 and 82:
The FBI’s polygraph program was i
Page 83 and 84:
awareness programs relating to poly
Page 85 and 86:
DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
Page 87 and 88:
Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
Page 89 and 90:
Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
Page 91 and 92:
Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
Page 93 and 94:
(SCI). Before being given access to
Page 95 and 96:
eceived in the wake of recent terro
Page 97 and 98:
under minimum security controls. Th
Page 99 and 100:
carriers receive timely security cl
Page 101 and 102:
with the true scope of improper act
Page 103 and 104:
SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
Page 105 and 106:
In general, we found serious weakne
Page 107 and 108:
executive will ensure constant focu
Page 109 and 110:
technical security countermeasures.
Page 111 and 112:
Eighty-five percent of those office
Page 113 and 114:
months training in investigations,
Page 115 and 116:
accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
Page 117 and 118:
Unfortunately, reporting to securit
Page 119 and 120:
security violations should be subje
Page 121 and 122:
and training. -106-
Page 123 and 124:
Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
Page 125 and 126:
Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
Page 127 and 128:
Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
Page 129 and 130:
Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
Page 131 and 132:
COMMISSION CHARTER
Page 133 and 134:
time equivalent government personne
Page 135 and 136:
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission
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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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