A Review of FBI Security Programs

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security programs. Thus, many agencies have established specialized units to conduct financial analyses. Hanssen himself gave us grounds to support that decision: No one knew of my espionage activities except the Russians, and it was done anonymously. The only thing that possibly could have uncovered my espionage activities was a complete investigation of my financial positions and deposits to bank accounts. Before Ames’ arrest, CIA investigators used financial tools to determine that he had received $1.3 million from unexplained sources. By examining currency transaction records, investigators discovered three large transactions by Ames. Investigators also took advantage of rarely utilized National Security Letters available to intelligence organizations conducting espionage investigations to gain access to Ames’ bank accounts, credit card transactions, and loans. The financial analysis uncovered that Ames had made large cash expenditures for a car, a house, and home renovations. Ultimately, this financial information formed the predicate for an FBI investigation. In 1994, as a direct response to the Ames case, the CIA created a Financial Investigations Branch to focus on personnel identified as potential security risks because of financial anomalies. The branch is staffed by analysts, including Security Officers, auditors, and former IRS Special Agents, who receive extensive specialized training. Recommendation The FBI Should Adopt A Financial Disclosure Program And Develop A Technical Infrastructure To Support Financial Monitoring There are several reasons for the FBI to adopt a financial monitoring program beyond the need to comply with Executive and Congressional mandates. Financial disclosure and monitoring are effective tools in reinvestigations, adjudications, and espionage investigations. Financial disclosure can identify unexplained wealth and personnel who are financially -66-
overextended and potentially at risk. 22 The FBI should create a Financial Investigations and Analytical Unit and develop a financial monitoring system into which employees can enter data electronically, encrypted to ensure security. The automated system should be able to apply algorithms to identify unusual financial patterns and compare employee generated data with external sources to determine whether the employee has unreported or unexplained wealth or excessive indebtedness. Information from the FDF and the automated analysis can be used in adjudications. The financial disclosure system will depend on the skill and experience of those who conduct financial investigations. Thus, the Bureau must recruit and develop a well-trained, experienced group of investigators and analysts. The CIA’s experience suggests the possibility that the FBI workforce will not initially have a positive reaction to the financial disclosure program. Consequently, the Bureau should educate its workforce about the financial disclosure and analysis programs and the ways in which financial information will be used. The FBI should be able to benefit from programs recently implemented at the CIA, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Customs. THE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM The polygraph examination is perhaps the most controversial tool in personnel security programs. Proponents of polygraph examinations for security screening advance three arguments in its favor. First, they assert that the polygraph is a source of important adjudicative information that often cannot be obtained through other investigative methods. Second, advocates contend that the polygraph is a deterrent: Undesirable candidates will not 22 Hanssen has told Commission staff that he would have sought financial counseling from the Bureau’s Employee Assistance Program, had he been assured of confidentiality. We recommend that the FBI make sure that sufficient resources have been allocated to that program to develop a strong financial counseling component. -67-
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U.S. Department of Justice A Review
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Commission for the Review of FBI Se
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Contents Executive Summary ........
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The Commission for the Review of FB
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in FBI security programs that will
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Unlike other Intelligence Community
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INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
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un by an officer in the Soviet mili
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establishment, U.S. penetration of
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operatives he had exposed as double
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Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
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een transferred to FBI Headquarters
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Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
Page 27 and 28: Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
Page 29 and 30: others.” In calling for the estab
Page 31 and 32: have discovered in FBI security pro
Page 33 and 34: The following is a compressed compi
Page 35 and 36: I. Security Investigations And Adju
Page 37 and 38: DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
Page 57 and 58: On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
Page 59 and 60: senior FBI officials responsible fo
Page 61 and 62: percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
Page 63 and 64: information security policies that
Page 65 and 66: PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
Page 67 and 68: The Commission conducted a detailed
Page 69 and 70: The PSU is also responsible for adm
Page 71 and 72: Unit for new applicants, the Person
Page 73 and 74: various elements is spread througho
Page 75 and 76: addressed. These interviews are ess
Page 77: identified, these individuals can b
Page 81 and 82: The FBI’s polygraph program was i
Page 83 and 84: awareness programs relating to poly
Page 85 and 86: DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
Page 87 and 88: Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
Page 89 and 90: Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
Page 91 and 92: Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
Page 93 and 94: (SCI). Before being given access to
Page 95 and 96: eceived in the wake of recent terro
Page 97 and 98: under minimum security controls. Th
Page 99 and 100: carriers receive timely security cl
Page 101 and 102: with the true scope of improper act
Page 103 and 104: SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
Page 105 and 106: In general, we found serious weakne
Page 107 and 108: executive will ensure constant focu
Page 109 and 110: technical security countermeasures.
Page 111 and 112: Eighty-five percent of those office
Page 113 and 114: months training in investigations,
Page 115 and 116: accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
Page 117 and 118: Unfortunately, reporting to securit
Page 119 and 120: security violations should be subje
Page 121 and 122: and training. -106-
Page 123 and 124: Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
Page 125 and 126: Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
Page 127 and 128: Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
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Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
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COMMISSION CHARTER
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time equivalent government personne
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WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission
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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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