A Review of FBI Security Programs

The FBI’s polygraph program was implemented in 1978 almost exclusively as an
interrogation tool in criminal cases. In the mid-1980s, the FBI began to mandate polygraph
examinations for agents in sensitive positions, although enforcement of the policy was rare
and selective. In 1994, FBI Director Freeh authorized an applicant polygraph screening
program to verify information and determine trustworthiness. Agents already on duty were
not required to be polygraphed. The applicant testing format has been extended to cover
espionage and terrorism.
When Hanssen was arrested in February 2001, most employees who entered on duty
before 1994, Hanssen among them, had never taken a polygraph examination. A handful of
Special Agents in sensitive positions had been tested, but only when detailed to organizations
like the CIA, where a counterintelligence polygraph test is required. After Hanssen’s arrest,
Director Freeh ordered polygraph testing for the “top 500 managers,” addressing contacts
with foreign intelligence services and unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
This effort was accomplished quickly, with four unresolved cases referred to the Washington
Field Office for investigation.
The FBI’s current polygraph program seems to be well managed and monitored.
Adequate quality control procedures appear to be in place. The FBI is considering
expanding the polygraph program to include five-year reinvestigation examinations and
random testing for all personnel.
Use of the polygraph in other entities within the Intelligence Community is
instructive. The CIA has utilized the polygraph as a screening tool since 1948. Over the
years, the Agency expanded the program beyond applicant screening to include testing of
industrial contractors and validation of operational assets. The goal of the CIA
reinvestigation program is to test at least every five years persons with the most sensitive
access and those with staff or staff-like access. The remaining population is tested every ten
years.
In the aftermath of Ames’ espionage, the CIA undertook a comprehensive review of
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