A Review of FBI Security Programs

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The Intelligence Community as a whole has failed to learn from history, a failure that is mirrored in the fragmented security policy governing members of that community. Each agency is responsible for implementing its own security system in compliance with government-wide mandates. The Bureau’s security policies, for instance, are an amalgam of its own traditional practices and a sometimes imperfect reflection of a slough of Executive Orders, National Security Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, Director of Central Intelligence Directives, Congressional enactments, and other mandates. We are not the first to note the lack of a system to ensure that security policy is implemented properly in the Intelligence Community and that members of that community learn from their brethren’s mistakes. In 1994, a Joint Security Commission declared that: . . . [F]undamental weaknesses in the security structure and culture . . . must be fixed. Security policy formulation is fragmented. Multiple groups with differing interests and authorities work independently of one another and with insufficient horizontal integration. Efforts are duplicated and coordination is arduous and slow. Each department or agency produces its own implementation rules that can introduce subtle changes or additions to the overall policy. There is no effective mechanism to ensure commonality. 10 Consequently, in a report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, the Joint Commission recommended that a security executive committee be established to “unify security policy development; serve as a mechanism for coordination, dispute resolution, evaluation, and oversight; and provide a focal point for Congressional and public inquiries regarding security policy. . . .” Almost a decade earlier, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asserted that “more needs to be done to ensure that agencies learn from each other’s experiences and that progress achieved in one area can have benefits for 10 Redefining Security 2 (Feb. 1994). -21-
others.” In calling for the establishment of a comprehensive National Security Program, the Committee warned: If there is no national policy, . . . there is no standard against which to hold each department accountable. If national policies are fragmented, outdated or unbalanced, security becomes subordinated to other departmental priorities and interagency disputes. This has occurred far too often in recent years. 11 And it has continued to occur in the sixteen years since the Select Committee issued its report. Consequently, in addition to the particular recommendations about Bureau policies that we make in our report, we offer a more global recommendation: a system should be established whereby security lapses in a particular entity lead to improved security measures throughout the entire Intelligence Community. Determining how this system should be structured is outside our mandate, but the need for it is obvious. Our report contains many recommendations for changes in the FBI’s policies and practices. We are pleased to see that the Bureau has already begun to examine its security programs and has independently implemented some of our recommendations. Critics often assert that the problems we have examined, as well as other well publicized missteps the Bureau has taken in recent years, are the product of a culture ingrained within the FBI that will make meaningful reform impossible. We found many instances of Bureau employees affording respect to deficient practices simply because they are Bureau practices and other instances when state-of-the-art practices in other agencies were rejected simply because they were not Bureau practices. However, the vast majority of FBI employees with whom we spoke have been shaken by Hanssen’s treason; they are acutely aware of the damage he has done to the country and to the reputation of the institution they love; and they seem to understand the necessity of reforming inadequate practices. The reaction of other agencies recently betrayed from within shows that organizations that instill esprit in their members 11 Meeting The Espionage Challenge: A Review of U.S. Counterintelligence And Security Programs, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate 39 & 61 (Oct. 3, 1986). -22-
Page 1 and 2: U.S. Department of Justice A Review
Page 3 and 4: Commission for the Review of FBI Se
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary ........
Page 7 and 8: The Commission for the Review of FB
Page 9 and 10: in FBI security programs that will
Page 11 and 12: Unlike other Intelligence Community
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
Page 15 and 16: un by an officer in the Soviet mili
Page 17 and 18: establishment, U.S. penetration of
Page 19 and 20: operatives he had exposed as double
Page 21 and 22: Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
Page 23 and 24: een transferred to FBI Headquarters
Page 25 and 26: Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
Page 27: Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
Page 31 and 32: have discovered in FBI security pro
Page 33 and 34: The following is a compressed compi
Page 35 and 36: I. Security Investigations And Adju
Page 37 and 38: DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
Page 57 and 58: On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
Page 59 and 60: senior FBI officials responsible fo
Page 61 and 62: percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
Page 63 and 64: information security policies that
Page 65 and 66: PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
Page 67 and 68: The Commission conducted a detailed
Page 69 and 70: The PSU is also responsible for adm
Page 71 and 72: Unit for new applicants, the Person
Page 73 and 74: various elements is spread througho
Page 75 and 76: addressed. These interviews are ess
Page 77 and 78: identified, these individuals can b
Page 79 and 80:
overextended and potentially at ris
Page 81 and 82:
The FBI’s polygraph program was i
Page 83 and 84:
awareness programs relating to poly
Page 85 and 86:
DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
Page 87 and 88:
Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
Page 89 and 90:
Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
Page 91 and 92:
Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
Page 93 and 94:
(SCI). Before being given access to
Page 95 and 96:
eceived in the wake of recent terro
Page 97 and 98:
under minimum security controls. Th
Page 99 and 100:
carriers receive timely security cl
Page 101 and 102:
with the true scope of improper act
Page 103 and 104:
SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
Page 105 and 106:
In general, we found serious weakne
Page 107 and 108:
executive will ensure constant focu
Page 109 and 110:
technical security countermeasures.
Page 111 and 112:
Eighty-five percent of those office
Page 113 and 114:
months training in investigations,
Page 115 and 116:
accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
Page 117 and 118:
Unfortunately, reporting to securit
Page 119 and 120:
security violations should be subje
Page 121 and 122:
and training. -106-
Page 123 and 124:
Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
Page 125 and 126:
Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
Page 127 and 128:
Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
Page 129 and 130:
Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
Page 131 and 132:
COMMISSION CHARTER
Page 133 and 134:
time equivalent government personne
Page 135 and 136:
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission
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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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