A Review of FBI Security Programs

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the use of the polygraph in its counterintelligence program. The Agency implemented a Quality Assurance Program to review polygraph results and ensure consistency in test application, interpretation, and instrumentation. 23 The CIA went through a difficult period after the Ames case and implementation of the new screening program. Tightened procedures and attention to counterintelligence testing led to increased reliance on the polygraph and increased scrutiny of cases with significant physiological responses. The result was the so-called “A to Z cases,” several hundred unresolved polygraph cases referred to the CIA’s Counterintelligence Center and ultimately to the FBI. Some of these cases were open for years, causing delays in assignments and promotions. The practical suspension of these officers, or “ghosts” as they were known throughout the CIA, had a devastating effect on morale and undermined confidence in the polygraph. Ultimately, all but a few of these cases were closed as unrelated to counterintelligence concerns. The CIA and the National Security Agency have kept up with technological enhancements in the field and use specialized tools to standardize the technical aspects of the discipline. Computerized polygraph instruments and the digital transfer of files and charts between headquarters and the field through secure connections have drastically improved efficiency. The new technology allows for seamless case management of a widely dispersed work force, near real-time quality control from headquarters, and the reduction of time and storage space. These agencies also spend considerable resources on employee 23 CIA examiners, as well as FBI examiners, are trained at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI), a recognized center for polygraph training, research, and development. DoDPI emphasizes criminal testing, the most common use of the polygraph within the government. DoDPI has also implemented a counterintelligence training module taught by CIA personnel. After the three-week CI module at DoDPI, new CIA examiners continue CI training at the Agency because of the complexity of counterintelligence and security examinations. Likewise, NSA examiners, upon completing DoDPI training, receive extensive additional training and are closely monitored until they become proficient in counterintelligence polygraphy. -70-
awareness programs relating to polygraph examinations. Educational briefings are held regularly, as well as one-on-one sessions when requested, so that the concerns of polygraph candidates can be addressed before the examination. RECOMMENDATION The FBI Should Implement A Counterintelligence Polygraph Program And Create An Infrastructure To Support The Program The FBI should continue to conduct full-scope tests on applicants and should adopt a counterintelligence test in reinvestigations of employees and non-FBI personnel with SCI and special access clearances. This approach focuses on personnel who may pose the greatest risk to national security and minimizes the risk of false positives. 24 Bureau training is currently insufficient for counterintelligence testing, which requires technical skills for eliciting information, developing themes, and understanding CI issues, skills that differ from criminal or full-scope testing skills. As the Bureau moves into specific-issue CI testing, it should develop quality control and assurance programs for this discipline. The Bureau should upgrade the technical instruments used in its polygraph program. Improved technology and computer driven systems will ease data storage and transmission of results for Headquarters review. The systems will also permit the FBI to keep statistics and conduct audits. Adverse personnel actions should not be taken solely on the basis of polygraph results. This judgment is consistent with current FBI policy, which establishes a procedure for reviewing examinations that produce “no opinion,” inconclusive, or “deceptive” results. 24 Our recommendations concerning polygraphy for the most part comport with changes the Bureau made following the detection of Hanssen’s espionage. However, those changes are often embodied in interim or draft policy statements, which we believe should receive final approval. -71-
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U.S. Department of Justice A Review
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Commission for the Review of FBI Se
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Contents Executive Summary ........
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The Commission for the Review of FB
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in FBI security programs that will
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Unlike other Intelligence Community
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INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
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un by an officer in the Soviet mili
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establishment, U.S. penetration of
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operatives he had exposed as double
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Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
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een transferred to FBI Headquarters
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Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
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Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
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others.” In calling for the estab
Page 31 and 32: have discovered in FBI security pro
Page 33 and 34: The following is a compressed compi
Page 35 and 36: I. Security Investigations And Adju
Page 37 and 38: DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
Page 57 and 58: On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
Page 59 and 60: senior FBI officials responsible fo
Page 61 and 62: percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
Page 63 and 64: information security policies that
Page 65 and 66: PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
Page 67 and 68: The Commission conducted a detailed
Page 69 and 70: The PSU is also responsible for adm
Page 71 and 72: Unit for new applicants, the Person
Page 73 and 74: various elements is spread througho
Page 75 and 76: addressed. These interviews are ess
Page 77 and 78: identified, these individuals can b
Page 79 and 80: overextended and potentially at ris
Page 81: The FBI’s polygraph program was i
Page 85 and 86: DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
Page 87 and 88: Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
Page 89 and 90: Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
Page 91 and 92: Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
Page 93 and 94: (SCI). Before being given access to
Page 95 and 96: eceived in the wake of recent terro
Page 97 and 98: under minimum security controls. Th
Page 99 and 100: carriers receive timely security cl
Page 101 and 102: with the true scope of improper act
Page 103 and 104: SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
Page 105 and 106: In general, we found serious weakne
Page 107 and 108: executive will ensure constant focu
Page 109 and 110: technical security countermeasures.
Page 111 and 112: Eighty-five percent of those office
Page 113 and 114: months training in investigations,
Page 115 and 116: accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
Page 117 and 118: Unfortunately, reporting to securit
Page 119 and 120: security violations should be subje
Page 121 and 122: and training. -106-
Page 123 and 124: Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
Page 125 and 126: Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
Page 127 and 128: Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
Page 129 and 130: Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
Page 131 and 132: COMMISSION CHARTER
Page 133 and 134:
time equivalent government personne
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WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission
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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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