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U.S. Department of Justice A Review
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Commission for the Review of FBI Se
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Contents Executive Summary ........
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The Commission for the Review of FB
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in FBI security programs that will
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Unlike other Intelligence Community
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INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
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un by an officer in the Soviet mili
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establishment, U.S. penetration of
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operatives he had exposed as double
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Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
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een transferred to FBI Headquarters
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Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
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Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
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others.” In calling for the estab
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have discovered in FBI security pro
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The following is a compressed compi
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I. Security Investigations And Adju
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DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
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of Central Intelligence Directives
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II. The Office of Security Should D
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
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Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
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een filled, the persons assigned of
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with the preliminary damage assessm
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FBI was investigating him. 13 While
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focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
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in unrestricted administrative case
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On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
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senior FBI officials responsible fo
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percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
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information security policies that
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PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
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The Commission conducted a detailed
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The PSU is also responsible for adm
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Unit for new applicants, the Person
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- Page 75 and 76: addressed. These interviews are ess
- Page 77 and 78: identified, these individuals can b
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- Page 81 and 82: The FBI’s polygraph program was i
- Page 83 and 84: awareness programs relating to poly
- Page 85 and 86: DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
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- Page 91 and 92: Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
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- Page 95 and 96: eceived in the wake of recent terro
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- Page 101 and 102: with the true scope of improper act
- Page 103 and 104: SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
- Page 105 and 106: In general, we found serious weakne
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- Page 111 and 112: Eighty-five percent of those office
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- Page 115 and 116: accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
- Page 117 and 118: Unfortunately, reporting to securit
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- Page 121 and 122: and training. -106-
- Page 123: Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
- Page 127 and 128: Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
- Page 129 and 130: Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
- Page 131 and 132: COMMISSION CHARTER
- Page 133 and 134: time equivalent government personne
- Page 135 and 136: WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission