A Review of FBI Security Programs

establishment, U.S. penetration of Soviet satellite transmissions, U.S. attempts to recruit
Soviet intelligence officers, a limitation in NSA’s ability to read Soviet communications,
detailed evaluations of FBI double-agent operations, and other extraordinarily sensitive
intelligence operations. For instance, Hanssen revealed that U.S. State Department diplomat,
Felix Bloch, was under investigation for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Bloch’s
Soviet handlers warned him about the investigation, and he was able to avoid prosecution.
Hanssen told his handlers in a November 1985 note that “[e]ventually, [he] would
appreciate an escape plan” because “[n]othing lasts forever.” He later suggested that they
communicate through a “microcomputer `bulletin board,’” a suggestion the Soviets
apparently did not accept.
In 1987, Hanssen started to transmit information and receive payments by establishing
near his home in northern Virginia several “dead drops” or pre-arranged, hidden locations
for clandestine exchanges that made it unnecessary for him to meet Soviet intelligence
officers.
In 1988, Hanssen gave the Soviets the first of many computer diskettes he would use
to transmit information and documents. At a minimum, the information and documents were
classified Secret and contained warnings like the following from the cover sheet to a
comprehensive review of Soviet penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community, a review
that Hanssen compromised:
IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE
UTMOST CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ITS HANDLING. THE
CONTENTS INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SENSITIVE
SOURCE ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF PENETRATION
OF THE FBI BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE
DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE HIGHLY SENSITIVE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND METHODS. ACCESS
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.
In 1989, the KGB presented several awards to the intelligence officers involved in the
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