A Review of FBI Security Programs

aware of the procedures for receipt, storage, dissemination, and disposition of that
information, most do not have detailed or consistent knowledge about those procedures and
are not aware of the written authorities governing them. Our own observations corroborate
employee anecdotes about security lapses, such as SCIF doors propped open with no access
controls, SCI material faxed on non-secure machines and incorporated into unclassified
documents on uncleared word processors, and SCI material transported without proper
protection.
IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Written Guidance On TS/SCI Should Be Current, Clear, And In Compliance
With DCIDs
FBI manuals and other written policy statements should incorporate changes made
over time by Bureau Electronic Communications and should comply with Executive Orders
and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Written policies should provide clear,
specific guidance to Security Officers, who are sometimes unaware of policy because they
do not know how to locate it. Policy amendments and clarifications should be routed to
Security Officers. The manuals should also be revised to remove widespread confusion
about controlling TS/SCI documents obtained through electronic systems and working
documents that have not been incorporated into official files. Manuals and other written
guides should be revised to address SCIF operating procedures.
V. The Operations Of The Special File Room Should Be Improved By Eliminating
Unnecessary Classified Material And Enhancing Staffing, Training, And
Equipment
The Bureau should undertake the difficult, labor-intensive task of reviewing the
hundreds of thousands of files within the Special File Room to destroy all documents eligible
for destruction, especially if the Bureau decides to maintain the large amount of TS/SCI
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