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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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some <strong>FBI</strong> personnel routinely chose not to upload certain information into ACS. For<br />

instance, it is common knowledge within the Bureau that the New York Field Office (NYFO)<br />

generally refuses to upload certain types <strong>of</strong> national-security information. NYFO<br />

intelligence agents have confirmed that this is the case. In 1995, NYFO personnel were<br />

asked to assess ACS as a pilot system before it was deployed, and they developed significant<br />

concerns about security. An intern from the Massachusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology was<br />

given ordinary user access and challenged to discover system vulnerabilities. In an<br />

afternoon, the intern accessed a number <strong>of</strong> restricted files.<br />

NYFO intelligence agents have also long worried that, if they were to upload all caserelated<br />

information, as required, not only would restricted files be at risk <strong>of</strong> compromise, but<br />

information contained in unrestricted files viewed in the aggregate might create complete<br />

pictures that should not be disseminated throughout the Bureau. These agents also believe<br />

that it is possible to ascertain user passwords by employing ACS system tools.<br />

Skepticism about ACS security is not limited to NYFO. At the Engineering Research<br />

Facility, a program manager operating a Top Secret/SCI program noted that his unit does not<br />

upload into ACS even sanitized versions <strong>of</strong> the unit’s reports. Instead, the unit uploads only<br />

verification that a report exists and requires that prospective readers request the report in<br />

hard copy. Personnel in the Washington and Indianapolis field <strong>of</strong>fices also expressed<br />

concerns about uploading classified information into ACS, particularly asset information, and<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten they do not upload that information.<br />

Several ACS users described a common situation that could result in the inadvertent<br />

exposure <strong>of</strong> files intended to be restricted. Documents uploaded to ACS may be attached to<br />

multiple case files. Frequently, a document is sent to a substantive case file, which may be<br />

restricted, and to an administrative file, which <strong>of</strong>ten is not. Thus, the uploaded document is<br />

restricted when serialized in the substantive case file, but not when serialized in the<br />

unrestricted administrative file. For example, NYFO intelligence agents pointed out that<br />

classified information from the Washington Field Office’s annual asset reports can be found<br />

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