A Review of FBI Security Programs

eceived in the wake of recent terrorist attacks.
While statutes and regulations limit the Bureau’s authority to destroy TS/SCI material
that is part of an FBI file, two steps can be taken to reduce the amount of unnecessary paper.
One is to develop a more effective profile to control the amount of information sent to the
Bureau by NSA, CIA, and other agencies. Tailored descriptions of the material FBI
personnel need will reduce the large volume of marginally useful information coming to the
FBI and warehoused in SFR space. The second step is prompt destruction of unneeded
material. Some FBI personnel assert that the failure to destroy unneeded TS/SCI is rooted
in a concern about potential personal or institutional embarrassment if destruction of
particular documents is challenged in the future. However, warehousing thousands of
documents to ward off possible future criticism is unproductive because forgotten and
unindexed SCI is of no greater use than destroyed material.
VI.
SCIF Operations Must Be Improved By Promulgating Clear, Enforceable Rules
And Providing Training For SCIF Tenants
The operation of Bureau SCIFs across the country is inconsistent and sometimes
improper, for example, doors are propped open, visitors are unchallenged or unescorted, and
end-of-day inspections do not occur. SCIF operations should be consistent across the Bureau
and should be controlled by clearly written guidelines, as the DCIDs require. This will also
require improved training for SCIF personnel.
SCIF accreditation, daily operations, and periodic reviews require much greater
resources than are currently allotted. When briefed into SCI operations, FBI personnel
should receive clear and complete instructions about proper SCIF operations.
-81-