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anarchist rejections of the state 53<br />
The second practical effect of the critique concerns the permissible<br />
means of anarchist change. Here, anarchists are divided into two<br />
camps. On the one hand stand those who argue that change can only<br />
be won through non-violent methods. On the other are those who<br />
contend that organized violence can only be destroyed by violence.<br />
This division will be discussed in Chapter 4. The more immediate<br />
issue to consider is how anarchists explain the success of government.<br />
The answer, in large part, lies in their conceptions of authority.<br />
authority and the state<br />
If government describes the mechanism of the state’s rule, authority<br />
is the principle that legitimizes the capacity to rule. According to<br />
Bakunin:<br />
Every logical and sincere theory of the State is essentially founded<br />
on the principle of authority – that is to say on the … idea that the<br />
masses, always incapable of governing themselves, must submit at<br />
all times to the benevolent yoke of a wisdom and a justice, which<br />
one way or another, is imposed on them from above … . 23<br />
Anarchist conceptions of state authority centre on three ideas: that<br />
authority is commanding, controlling and corrupting. Anarchists<br />
tend to discuss these ideas critically, linking command to the<br />
suspension of reason (‘private judgement’); control to the stifling of<br />
initiative and creativity; and corruption to the inhibition of harmonious<br />
social relations.<br />
The first idea, that authority is incompatible with private judgement,<br />
was at the heart of Godwin’s anarchism. It also formed the core<br />
of Robert Paul Wolff’s essay, In Defence of Anarchism. Wolff characterized<br />
the authority of the state as ‘the right to command’ and the<br />
‘correlative obligation to obey the person who issues the command’.<br />
When subject to authority individuals behave in certain ways not<br />
because they believe them to be justified or right, but merely because<br />
they have been commanded to do them. The exercise of authority ‘is<br />
not a matter of doing what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of<br />
doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it’. Wolff contrasted<br />
authority with autonomy: the ‘freedom and responsibility’<br />
that define dignified human behaviour. Autonomy allows individuals<br />
to do what others tell them to do, but only because they have made a<br />
judgement about the rightness of the instruction, and not because