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164 GROUNDS FOR REFUSING REGISTRATION<br />

in 1967, 1974, 1978, and 1990 (the registration dates at issue). Rather, my conclusion is<br />

that the evidence petitioners put forth fails to show that it was.<br />

Questions:<br />

1.) The TTAB decision is being appealed. Will it be reversed or upheld? Why?<br />

2.) If the TTAB decision is upheld, what are the practical effects? Are the Washington<br />

Redskins forbidden from using the mark? May others now use the mark without<br />

payment? How does that exert pressure on the Redskins? Remember, the loss of a<br />

Federally registered leaves behind common law marks—both state marks and Federal<br />

protection under section 1125(a).<br />

3.) Any standard to adjudicate 1052(a) cancellation of disparaging marks has to answer<br />

the central “what, who, how many and when” questions.<br />

a.) “What”? The TTAB and the District Court agreed that the meaning of the word<br />

“Redskins” was to refer to Native Americans. It rejected an argument that that term had<br />

dropped out of usage and that the primary significance of the term was now its reference<br />

to the team. Do you agree? If you heard the word in a conversation, e.g. “How about<br />

those redskins?” what or who would you assume it referred to? Does it matter, so long<br />

as some people find the term offensive? Is the stylized Native American featured on the<br />

logo important to the analysis of the word mark?<br />

b.) “Who”? Whose view of whether a mark is disparaging is relevant? The TTAB and<br />

the District Court believed it was those who believed they were being disparaged. Do you<br />

agree? And who has standing to oppose registration of a mark? The TTAB said that the<br />

plaintiffs must have a “real interest”—meaning “a legitimate personal interest”—in the<br />

outcome of the proceeding. The five Native American plaintiffs, all of whom found<br />

“redskins” disparaging, readily met that standard. Amanda Blackhorse et al v. Pro-Football,<br />

Inc. (TTAB 2014). Do you agree? Does this meet the Article 3 threshold for standing?<br />

c.) “How many”? How many members of a group need to find the mark disparaging<br />

in order to satisfy the standard for cancellation? The TTAB found that when 30% of<br />

a group finds a term disparaging, this is a “substantial composite” sufficient to prohibit<br />

federal registration. Is this threshold high? Low? What kind of evidentiary showing<br />

should be required?<br />

d.) “When”? The court and the TTAB agreed that the relevant date at which the<br />

finding of disparagement had to be made was at the time of registration, which in the<br />

case of the earliest mark was 1967. Do you agree that is the relevant time frame? What<br />

if a mark we find wildly offensive today had been registered when the term was regarded<br />

as respectable? Should it be subject to cancellation nevertheless?<br />

4.) A 2010 case prevented registration of KHORAN for wine because the term would be<br />

recognized as referring to the Koran, and its use on wine disparaged the beliefs of Muslim<br />

Americans. See In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1215 (TTAB 2010). Sound?<br />

PROBLEM 6-1<br />

Does 1052(a) abridge the freedom of speech in a way that violates the First<br />

Amendment? Consider these materials in developing your answer.

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