cyckV4

390 COPYRIGHT’S “REACH”: INFRINGEMENT
to understand how computer programming works, at least at the highest, most abstract
level. (You began this journey by reading Lotus and Oracle in the previous chapter; it
continues here.) So that part of the decision has been left only mildly edited—it is not
“Physics for Poets” but it might be “Coding for Law Student, Humanities Majors.” We
hope you find it of interest. Resist the inexorable tendency to have your IQ plummet
toward zero whenever someone says “parameter,” “function call” or “API—(application
programming interface).” This is a description of a system of code, normally expressed
in a highly technical language most people do not fully understand (thus needing smart
people to decipher it) that runs a lot of important things. Guess what you hope to do for
a living? Not so different, is it?
The second reason the decision is long is that it is a classic case—maybe the classic
case together with Lotus v. Borland and Sega v. Accolade—demonstrating a court
wrestling with the incorporation of a new technology into copyright. One could look at
the decision as frankly policy-oriented in its concerns about how copyright will affect
innovation and competition—and its close tailoring of the doctrine in order to achieve
that result. On the other hand, you could see this as a classic example of the common law
method. Note how the court uses existing traditional copyright doctrines—the ideaexpression
distinction, merger, scènes à faire—as it deals with this new technology.
Finally, Computer Associates, together with other cases you have yet to read, ended
up shaping the law of software copyright on the most fundamental level. Ask yourself
the following, is it really true now that a copyright over a book or a piece of music is the
same as a software copyright? Do we really have a different law of copyright for
software? Or is it simply that the subject matter’s own peculiarities demand different
answers to the same questions?
Computer Associates v. Altai, Inc.
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
In recent years, the growth of computer science has spawned a number of challenging
legal questions, particularly in the field of copyright law. As scientific knowledge advances,
courts endeavor to keep pace, and sometimes—as in the area of computer technology—they
are required to venture into less than familiar waters. This is not a new development, though.
“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes
in technology.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., (1984).
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Supreme
Court has stated that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause . . . is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare. . . .” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The author’s benefit, however, is
clearly a “secondary” consideration. “[T]he ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151 (1975).
Thus, the copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand,
it affords protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must
appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic