Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
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The Weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the Pragmatic Tradition 95<br />
a culture <strong>and</strong> a sense <strong>of</strong> social cohesion. The k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> people<br />
we are, the k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> values we respect <strong>and</strong> the k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> law we<br />
have <strong>and</strong> need depend to some degree on the very fact <strong>of</strong><br />
long historical cont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>and</strong> tradition. But that raises different<br />
<strong>and</strong> more complex issues which I shall not go <strong>in</strong>to<br />
now.<br />
It is worth add<strong>in</strong>g that the use <strong>of</strong> reason <strong>and</strong> rational<br />
argument <strong>in</strong> these ways is someth<strong>in</strong>g which not only the<br />
pure pragmatist must face up to; it is also an answer to the<br />
extreme political <strong>and</strong> radical view <strong>of</strong> law as a mere manifestation<br />
<strong>of</strong> power. There are today sceptics who <strong>in</strong>sist that law<br />
is just an <strong>in</strong>strument <strong>of</strong> power, <strong>and</strong> that those who have<br />
power simply choose the values which they wish to further.<br />
Even judges, on this view, are simply further<strong>in</strong>g policies <strong>of</strong><br />
their own choos<strong>in</strong>g when they make important decisions<br />
about the law, <strong>and</strong> are not engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> rational debate. 9<br />
This is a complex question which I do not have time to<br />
explore fully here, so I will content myself with a number <strong>of</strong><br />
bare assertions. First, rational argument for the purposes I<br />
have suggested does presuppose some start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the<br />
form <strong>of</strong> agreed goals. It is only when we know what our<br />
goals are, that we can debate rationally as to the best means<br />
<strong>of</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g there. Secondly, it is, I th<strong>in</strong>k, clear <strong>and</strong> obvious<br />
that agreement could never be secured today on any s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t unless it was so vacuous that it would be<br />
pretty well useless for this purpose, for <strong>in</strong>stance, that all law<br />
must serve the welfare <strong>of</strong> the people. But thirdly, it is by no<br />
means impossible to secure a wide measure <strong>of</strong> agreement on<br />
some at least <strong>of</strong> the assumptions which judges <strong>and</strong> other<br />
decision makers must use as start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts. I do not sug-<br />
9 See Murphy <strong>and</strong> Rawl<strong>in</strong>gs, "After the Ancien Regime: The Writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><br />
Judgments <strong>in</strong> the House <strong>of</strong> Lords 1979/1980," (1981) 44 M.L.R. 621<br />
<strong>and</strong> (1982) 45 M.L.R. 34.