Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
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<strong>Theory</strong> Beneath the Surface 155<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutional change. But still, judges decide what the law is,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the case <strong>of</strong> appellate judges this is a very important<br />
part <strong>of</strong> their function. Now <strong>in</strong> modern times a huge amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> academic attention has been paid to the nature <strong>of</strong> this<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> the judicial function. We have all sorts <strong>of</strong> theories<br />
about what judges ought to be do<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> what they are<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g when they make new law. We have a substantial literature<br />
about the k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> arguments which are regarded as<br />
appropriate for a court to use <strong>in</strong> justification <strong>of</strong> its decisions<br />
<strong>and</strong> about the k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> arguments which are clearly not<br />
appropriate. But what about the judges themselves? How<br />
do they view their function as lawmakers? How do they<br />
view their role as aga<strong>in</strong>st the legislature? What about legal<br />
practitioners? What do they th<strong>in</strong>k about the k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> arguments<br />
which may appropriately be addressed to the courts?<br />
These questions are difficult to answer satisfactorily,<br />
because the issues <strong>of</strong> theory are not openly confronted by<br />
the judges themselves. The judges tend to say little about<br />
these issues <strong>in</strong> their judgments <strong>in</strong> court, <strong>and</strong> practitioners<br />
themselves develop an <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct for the k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> arguments<br />
which may be used <strong>in</strong> court, <strong>and</strong> the k<strong>in</strong>ds which may not.<br />
Once aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> other words, the theory turns out to be<br />
implicit <strong>in</strong> the way barristers <strong>and</strong> judges work, but it is<br />
there for all that.<br />
Consider the fundamental issue whether, <strong>and</strong> to what<br />
extent, issues <strong>of</strong> policy can appropriately be addressed by<br />
barristers <strong>and</strong> judges. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as the law is unclear <strong>in</strong> any<br />
particular case, <strong>and</strong> some development <strong>of</strong> the legal rules is<br />
needed before a case can be decided, it seems to most academics<br />
today to be almost beyond dispute that judges do<br />
actually use arguments <strong>of</strong> policy. 13 They argue, for<br />
13 See John Bell, Policy Arguments <strong>in</strong> Judicial Decisions (1983).