Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
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<strong>Pragmatism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>English</strong> <strong>Law</strong> 13<br />
grounds, <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> the Entores 32 rul<strong>in</strong>g that a telexed<br />
acceptance is only effective on receipt, pr<strong>in</strong>cipally because<br />
this rule seem to have worked without serious difficulty or<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>t. So if "logic" is occasionally alright, it seems that<br />
"strict logic" is beyond the pale. 33<br />
So where does all this leave us? Well, we must first recognise—as<br />
has <strong>of</strong>ten been po<strong>in</strong>ted out before—that when <strong>English</strong><br />
lawyers <strong>and</strong> judges reject the use <strong>of</strong> logic <strong>in</strong> the law,<br />
they are usually, perhaps always, us<strong>in</strong>g the word "logic" <strong>in</strong><br />
a somewhat imprecise <strong>and</strong> perhaps <strong>in</strong>correct sense. What<br />
they usually have <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is the syllogism, the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong><br />
deductive logic, whereby given a major <strong>and</strong> a m<strong>in</strong>or premise,<br />
a valid conclusion can be drawn. In the Morgan case it is<br />
clear that Lord Hailsham's unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to sanction a<br />
departure from logic was based on a more correct use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
term "logic." Given, he <strong>in</strong>sists, that the prohibited act <strong>in</strong><br />
rape is non-consensual <strong>in</strong>tercourse, <strong>and</strong> given secondly,<br />
that the guilty state <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is an <strong>in</strong>tention to commit it,<br />
then it would, as he says, follow <strong>in</strong>exorably that an honest<br />
though unreasonable mistake negatives the necessary <strong>in</strong>tention<br />
<strong>and</strong> should lead to an acquittal. All that this comes<br />
down to <strong>in</strong> the end is that if the law requires that an <strong>in</strong>tention<br />
<strong>of</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d must be shown before a person can be<br />
convicted <strong>of</strong> a particular type <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fence, then <strong>in</strong>deed, that<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention must be shown to exist. It would be a remarkably<br />
perverse judge who denied that this conclusion followed<br />
from the premises, <strong>and</strong> it would be a still more remarkable<br />
judge perhaps, who accepted the premises but directed the<br />
jury to convict the accused.<br />
32 [1955] 2Q.B. 327.<br />
33 For another example, see the House <strong>of</strong> Lords decision <strong>in</strong> the important<br />
patent case, Beecham Group Ltd., v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd. [1978] R.P.C.<br />
153, esp. at p. 204 per Lord Simon.