Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
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The Weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the Pragmatic Tradition 99<br />
character, <strong>and</strong> that there also possible long term purposes<br />
which can sometimes be served by oppos<strong>in</strong>g laws <strong>and</strong><br />
decisions. <strong>Law</strong>s <strong>and</strong> decisions which are apparently<br />
irrational <strong>in</strong> the sense that they do not seem to be appropriate<br />
means <strong>of</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>g to agreed goals may sometimes be<br />
justified as rational on the ground that they serve these<br />
longer term goals, but we cannot just assume that they are<br />
always rational <strong>in</strong> this way.<br />
If then we cannot answer the question by mere def<strong>in</strong>itional<br />
fiat, can we suggest any other answer? Is <strong>English</strong> law too<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten irrational <strong>in</strong> the simple sense that the law, or legal<br />
decisions, cannot be justified as serv<strong>in</strong>g any agreed upon<br />
goals? I th<strong>in</strong>k it is, though I can see that any answer to this<br />
question is likely to be largely impressionistic, <strong>and</strong> I am<br />
prepared at least to say that I th<strong>in</strong>k this reproach less justified<br />
today than it might have been twenty or fifty years ago.<br />
Perhaps it is not likely that a modern appeal judge would<br />
echo the words <strong>of</strong>jessel M.R., <strong>in</strong> a case <strong>in</strong> 1877. Faced with<br />
an old rule <strong>of</strong> dubious justice, he said, "It is very dangerous<br />
for modern judges to endeavour to f<strong>in</strong>d modern reasons for<br />
these old rules," 14 presumably with the implication that<br />
rules should be applied bl<strong>in</strong>dly, regardless <strong>of</strong> their purpose.<br />
There are some relatively modern cases, for <strong>in</strong>stance, Boots<br />
v. Pharmaceutical Society,' 5 —the case about <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>and</strong> acceptance<br />
<strong>in</strong> self-service shops—which seem to me to illustrate a<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued tendency to treat legal concepts as objective phenomena<br />
without regard to the purposes <strong>of</strong> the legal rules<br />
' Ex p. Good, Re Armitage (1877) 5 Ch.D. 46. But the decision at first<br />
<strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 207<br />
did <strong>in</strong>volve a highly mechanistic application <strong>of</strong> an old rule without any<br />
attempt to analyse its purposes. The decision was reversed but on a different<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t, [19661 2 Q.B. 56.<br />
1 f 19531 1 Q.B. 401.