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Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...

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96 The Weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the Pragmatic Tradition<br />

gest that judges always search for such consensus assumptions,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that they never pursue policies <strong>of</strong> their own, 10<br />

though even then I very much doubt whether judges ever<br />

consciously pursue <strong>in</strong>dividual idiosyncratic policies. If<br />

judges do sometimes take start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts which seem controversial<br />

to those who are not judges, I suspect it is because<br />

the judiciary as a whole tends to regard those start<strong>in</strong>g<br />

po<strong>in</strong>ts as non-controversial, which may well be a comment<br />

on the nature <strong>of</strong> our judiciary.<br />

I must now confront the question which I have been<br />

approach<strong>in</strong>g rather slowly. Does the pragmatic tradition <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>English</strong> law <strong>and</strong> the <strong>English</strong> legal system mean that we are<br />

hostile to rationality <strong>in</strong> the sense that we pay too little attention<br />

to the purposes <strong>of</strong> the law <strong>and</strong> legal processes? I now<br />

feel that this is a much more difficult question than I once<br />

thought. The difficulty seems to me to stem from the fact<br />

that, as I have already observed, the law serves so many<br />

disparate goals, that many decisions which may seem at<br />

first sight to be anti-rational- turn out on further exam<strong>in</strong>ation<br />

to be defensible on rational grounds, provided only we<br />

are prepared to take a long view about some <strong>of</strong> the goals <strong>of</strong><br />

the law <strong>and</strong> legal decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. Consider for <strong>in</strong>stance the<br />

problem <strong>of</strong> statutory <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which<br />

literal methods <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation can be <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten are contrasted<br />

with "purposive" <strong>in</strong>terpretation. 11 Literal methods<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation which defeat the probable parliamentary<br />

<strong>in</strong>tention <strong>and</strong> produce silly <strong>and</strong> even absurd results seem,<br />

from one viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, to be quite anti-rational. But this is<br />

perhaps arguable: it is <strong>in</strong> truth irrational only if we assume<br />

that the function <strong>of</strong> the judge is to give effect to the parlia-<br />

10 See John Bell, Policy Arguments <strong>in</strong> Judicial Decisions (1983).<br />

11 See, e.g. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (1985), pp. 200-211 (on "grammatical<br />

mean<strong>in</strong>g") <strong>and</strong> pp. 657-674 (on "purposive construction").

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