Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law - College of Social Sciences ...
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96 The Weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the Pragmatic Tradition<br />
gest that judges always search for such consensus assumptions,<br />
<strong>and</strong> that they never pursue policies <strong>of</strong> their own, 10<br />
though even then I very much doubt whether judges ever<br />
consciously pursue <strong>in</strong>dividual idiosyncratic policies. If<br />
judges do sometimes take start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts which seem controversial<br />
to those who are not judges, I suspect it is because<br />
the judiciary as a whole tends to regard those start<strong>in</strong>g<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts as non-controversial, which may well be a comment<br />
on the nature <strong>of</strong> our judiciary.<br />
I must now confront the question which I have been<br />
approach<strong>in</strong>g rather slowly. Does the pragmatic tradition <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>English</strong> law <strong>and</strong> the <strong>English</strong> legal system mean that we are<br />
hostile to rationality <strong>in</strong> the sense that we pay too little attention<br />
to the purposes <strong>of</strong> the law <strong>and</strong> legal processes? I now<br />
feel that this is a much more difficult question than I once<br />
thought. The difficulty seems to me to stem from the fact<br />
that, as I have already observed, the law serves so many<br />
disparate goals, that many decisions which may seem at<br />
first sight to be anti-rational- turn out on further exam<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
to be defensible on rational grounds, provided only we<br />
are prepared to take a long view about some <strong>of</strong> the goals <strong>of</strong><br />
the law <strong>and</strong> legal decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. Consider for <strong>in</strong>stance the<br />
problem <strong>of</strong> statutory <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which<br />
literal methods <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation can be <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten are contrasted<br />
with "purposive" <strong>in</strong>terpretation. 11 Literal methods<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation which defeat the probable parliamentary<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention <strong>and</strong> produce silly <strong>and</strong> even absurd results seem,<br />
from one viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, to be quite anti-rational. But this is<br />
perhaps arguable: it is <strong>in</strong> truth irrational only if we assume<br />
that the function <strong>of</strong> the judge is to give effect to the parlia-<br />
10 See John Bell, Policy Arguments <strong>in</strong> Judicial Decisions (1983).<br />
11 See, e.g. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (1985), pp. 200-211 (on "grammatical<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g") <strong>and</strong> pp. 657-674 (on "purposive construction").