JP 3-16, Multinational Operations - Defense Technical Information ...

Planning and Execution Considerations
information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications (LOCs) from an
enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces,
systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Equally important is the
application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire. Finally,
emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to
accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. As the MNFC’s mission requires, the
protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass protection of
noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and
interorganizational partners.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional information on the protection function.
b. Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute force
protection in the same way as the US Armed Forces. Some nations’ armed forces may or
may not be willing or able to assume the same risk as US forces. US commanders, whether
under US control or under a command relationship to a MNF, must continuously assess
threats and vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate force protection countermeasures
IAW published GCC directives. Special consideration must be given to personnel with
duties that require interaction with local populations.
c. Throughout multinational operations, risk management techniques and
methodologies should be used to reduce or offset risk by systematically identifying,
assessing, and controlling risk.
d. Another significant problem facing the MNF is the potential for friendly fire.
Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of
reference can increase this risk. MNF support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing
and reducing the friendly fire risk to the MNF by recommending operational coordination
measures and technological solutions.
e. Finally, commanders must understand that US forces, as part of a MNF, can
potentially be the greater target. Adversaries may view attacks against US Service members
as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted multinational or HN forces
to conduct these attacks against unsuspecting US forces. While these types of so-called
“insider” or “green on blue” attacks may be context-specific to a particular theater, JFCs
should nevertheless ensure that their protection plans at least take into account the potential
for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures as the situation dictates. US
forces operating at tactical levels may be especially vulnerable to unintended and
adverse exploitative use of information to gain advantage. Commanders should
implement clear measures to ensure tactical information is accurate, timely, and
adequately protected at all times.
f. Nontraditional threats, such as insider attacks, undermine an MNF’s ability in
establishing a secure and stable environment as well as the cohesion of the MNFs.
Strategically, these types of threats provide a propaganda platform from which adversaries
can not only threaten the MNF’s objectives, goals, and exit strategy but also undermine the
overall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust,
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