JP 3-16, Multinational Operations - Defense Technical Information ...

Planning and Execution Considerations
Forces Command, have developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures that
provide examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance.
(4) Share All Necessary Information
(a) Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence
about the situation and adversary consistent with national disclosure policy (NDP) and
theater guidance. However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not
be shared with coalition members unless approved by the appropriate authority.
(b) Force protection is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence
support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could
impact the commander’s force protection mission.
(c) When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, the
intelligence derived from that source should still be provided to other multinational partners
if at all possible. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) should establish procedures
for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence agencies often produce
highly classified reports that contain compartmented information. To the greatest extent
possible, this information should be disseminated using a tear line. A tear line enables the J-
2 and Service component intelligence elements to keep information above the tear line
(compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below. Having intelligence
production agencies use such tear lines should facilitate intelligence sharing. Such
considerations warrant increased emphasis for forces operating at the tactical level where
timely information is especially critical to mission success as well as prevention of friendly
fire and undesired collateral damage. When feasible, intelligence production organizations
operating in a multinational environment should implement a write for release without
dissemination restrictions policy to facilitate timely dissemination of tactical intelligence
partner organizations.
(d) The joint force J-2 should obtain the necessary authorizations from the
foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials (DIDOs)
from the CCMD J-2 or FDO as soon as possible. J-2 personnel should be knowledgeable of
the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The
assignment and use of qualified and certified FDOs and DIDOs are vital to safeguarding
classified information from inadvertent disclosure and will enhance the efficient flow of
intelligence.
(5) Conduct Complementary Operations
(a) Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary. Each nation
will have intelligence system strengths and limitations and unique and valuable capabilities.
HN security services’ capabilities, for example, may contribute significantly to force
protection. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguist
requirements, may help overcome such limitations.
(b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for
application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection
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