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JP 3-16, Multinational Operations - Defense Technical Information ...

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Chapter III<br />

(3) <strong>Multinational</strong> operations are becoming the norm for military operations, making<br />

intelligence and information sharing with partner nations increasingly important.<br />

Cyberspace connectivity, security, and assurance are essential for the multinational and HN<br />

forces’ effective mutual support during operations. Cyberspace interoperability issues<br />

should also be considered in light of the information assurance requirement.<br />

(4) Cyberspace efforts by all adversaries may include attempts to penetrate US,<br />

MNF, and HN networks to collect data on forces and systems, or to create denial or<br />

manipulation effects. Close coordination and partnership between forces, public-private<br />

stakeholders, and multinational partners will be required to rapidly develop and maintain<br />

cyberspace SA.<br />

15. Stability <strong>Operations</strong><br />

a. Stability operations are a core US military mission that helps to establish order that<br />

advances US interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace<br />

with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is<br />

to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market<br />

economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.<br />

b. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political)<br />

is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in<br />

noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not<br />

reoccur or that its effects are mitigated.<br />

c. Stability operations that support transition and reconstruction efforts primarily<br />

support USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to restore civil authority, rebuild<br />

the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities.<br />

d. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities<br />

should establish a sound foundation for operations in the stabilize and enable civil authority<br />

phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when<br />

sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition<br />

to operations in the stabilize phase and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and<br />

handover to another authority. Considerations include:<br />

(1) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services.<br />

(2) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized<br />

military and paramilitary forces.<br />

(3) Providing for the availability of cash.<br />

(4) Identifying and managing potential stabilize phase enemies.<br />

(5) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer,<br />

medical, multinational).<br />

III-32 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>16</strong>

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