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JP 3-16, Multinational Operations - Defense Technical Information ...

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Planning and Execution Considerations<br />

Notional Operation Plan Phases<br />

Plan Phases<br />

Level of Military Effort<br />

Phase 0<br />

Shape<br />

Phase I<br />

Deter<br />

Phase II<br />

Seize<br />

Initiative<br />

Seizing the<br />

Initiative Activities<br />

Phase III<br />

Dominate<br />

Dominating<br />

Activities<br />

Phase IV<br />

Stabilize<br />

Enabling Civil<br />

Authority<br />

Activity<br />

Stabilizing<br />

Activities<br />

Phase V<br />

Enable<br />

Civil<br />

Authority<br />

Phase 0<br />

Shape<br />

Deterring Activities<br />

Shaping Activities<br />

Theater<br />

Shaping<br />

Global<br />

Shaping<br />

OPLAN<br />

Approval<br />

OPORD<br />

Activation<br />

OPORD Execution<br />

OPORD<br />

Termination<br />

Legend<br />

OPLAN<br />

operation plan<br />

OPORD<br />

operation order<br />

Figure III-10. Notional Operation Plan Phases<br />

(2) Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the<br />

MNF, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities<br />

that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable<br />

breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a<br />

set of objectives is achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major<br />

change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven.<br />

Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s<br />

objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command relationships,<br />

force allocation, or even the design of the OA. An example is the shift of focus from<br />

sustained combat operations in the dominate phase to a preponderance of stability operations<br />

in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint<br />

force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters adversaries<br />

from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community take steps to<br />

establish or restore the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands<br />

an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks,<br />

and interorganizational coordination with a wider range of interagency and multinational<br />

III-51

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