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126 selecting securities<br />

movements in dividends that can be predicted plus a term reflecting<br />

the anticipation of fashions or fads among investors.”<br />

11. The excess volatility argument.remains controversial. For summary a<br />

of the debate, see Camerer and Weigelt (1986). Shiller (1987), pp.<br />

320-321, discusses departures from value, rather than excess<br />

volatility, as evidence of fads.<br />

12. See Niederhoffer (1971) on world news; Arrow (1982), Shiller (1984),<br />

and DeBondt (1985) on financial news; and Renshaw (1984) on<br />

panics. [OHanlon and Ward (1986) contend that Renshaw’s rules<br />

fail out-of-sample tests.] Other markets may also overreact [Frankel<br />

and Meese (1987)l.<br />

13. Chan (1988) claims that DeBondt and Thaler’s reversal effect is<br />

explained by changing risk Stocks suffering price declines become<br />

riskier, and this heightened risk explains their subsequent<br />

outperformance. However, DeBondt and Thaler (1987) demonstrate<br />

that losers subsequently have higher betas in up markets and lower<br />

betas in down markets, and thus reject the changing-risk<br />

explanation. Fama and French (1987b) advance two possible<br />

explanations for the price reversals-market inefficiency and<br />

changing +k premiums.<br />

14. French and Roll (1986) find that a significant portion of market<br />

volatility is due to mispricing. DeLong et al. (1987) maintain that<br />

noise traders cause prices to deviate so far from fair value as to<br />

create serious consequences for society as a whole.<br />

15. Black, quoted in Bemstein (1987u), p. 56. Shefrin and Statman (1987)<br />

ascribe the persistence of noise trading to errors in cognition.<br />

16. Akerlof and Yellen (1985) demonstrate that small amounts of<br />

irrationality can have large economic effects. See references to<br />

experimental markets in Plott (1987) and Hausch, Ziemba, and<br />

Rubinstein (1981).<br />

17. For a theoretical elaboration, see Russell and Thaler (1985).<br />

IS. DeLong et al. (1987) demonstrate that irrational traders can earn<br />

higher returns because they bear the large amount of risk that they<br />

induce, and this risk scares off more rational investors.<br />

19. For a theoretical model, see Aiyagari (1988).<br />

20. Furthermore, Jacobs (1986) shows a simple financial measure to be<br />

superior to present value in predicting stock returns to changes in .<br />

depreciation accounting methods having real economic impacts.<br />

21. For neglect, see Arbell, Carvell, and Strebel (1983); for sigma, see<br />

Levy (1978); and for earnings controversy, see Amott (1983).

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