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and object to the imposition of the injunction” and that “RICO was intended to provide broad equitable relief
under §1964(a).”).
137. No. C–09–04996, 2010 WL 2557503 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
138. Chanel, No. C–09–04996, at 17, 2010 WL 2557503 at *12. See also The North Face Apparel Corp. v.
Fujian Sharing Import & Export LTD., Case No. 10 Civ. 1630, Dkt. No. 54 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2011) (third
party domain name registry found to be in contempt of court for failing to comply with the injunction, because it
failed to remove the offending domains).
139. See Hermes International v. John Doe, 12-CV-1623(DLC), Dkt. No. 14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012)
(entering default judgment and ordering “Google, Bing, and Yahoo, and any social media websites including, but
not limited to, Facebook, Google+, and Twitter” to “de-index and remove from any search results pages”
infringing domain names and associated websites); Chanel, Inc. v. The Partnerships et al., Case No. 2:11-CV-
01508, Dk. No. 37, Nov. 14, 2011 at 10 (D. Nev.) (same).
140. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) provides: “The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or
oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give
notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
141. Pappan Enters. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998).
142. True Religion v. Xiaokang Lei, No. 11-cv-8242 (HB), at 8-16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011) (temporary
restraining order).
143. For an analysis of these, see Lemley, Levine, and Post, “Don’t Break the Internet,” 64 Stan. L. Rev.
Online 34 (2011) (available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dont-break-internet).
144. Id. Indeed, initial versions of SOPA contained a pre-litigation voluntary process which did not require
any TRO application or other court involvement:
Under SOPA, IP rightsholders could proceed vigilante-style against allegedly offending sites,
without any court hearing or any judicial intervention or oversight whatsoever. For example,
SOPA established a scheme under which an IP rightsholder need only notify credit card companies
of the facts supporting its “good faith belief” that an identified Internet site is “primarily
designed or operated for the purpose of” infringement. The recipients of that notice will then have
five days to cease doing business with the specified site by taking “technically feasible and
reasonable” steps to prevent it “from completing payment transactions” with customers. And all of
this occurs based upon a notice delivered by the rightsholder, which no neutral third party has
even looked at, let alone adjudicated on the merits.
Id. This voluntary process was deleted in a later Manager’s Amendment, meaning that the version of SOPA that
was withdrawn no longer contained any process that did not require application to a court. Even following such
removal, however, both SOPA and PIPA contemplated the possibility of proceedings that were ex parte as to the
targeted website.
145. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
146. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
147. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
148. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Jiang, No. 11-cv-24049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142630, at *9 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 12, 2011) (preliminary injunction).
149. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Reebok Int’l v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (“District courts do, and
must, have the authority to punish contemptuous violations of their orders.”); Chanel, Inc. v. Krispin, Case No.
08-23439, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123458, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010) (“Without prejudice to entering
additional sanctions to enforce compliance with the Court’s Permanent Injunction, the immediate relief that
should be entered to remedy Defendants’ continued non-compliance should be the entry of a Second Amended
Order Holding Defendants in Contempt.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1(b) (“An order committing a person for civil
contempt of a decree or injunction issued to enforce federal law may be served and enforced in any district.”).
152. Chanel, Inc. v. Krispin, Case No. 08-23439, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123458 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010).
153. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Brightside Boutique, Cause No. 1:11-CA-20 LY, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1464
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