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Chapter 3<br />
Websites. 3 In addition to public comment suggesting that a private right of action might be<br />
desirable, several witnesses testified before Congress that allowing a private right of action was<br />
necessary in order to allow smaller rightsholders the ability to combat these rogue sites even if the<br />
individual violation of their rights was not significant enough to warrant intervention by the<br />
government. 4<br />
48<br />
B. The Benefits of Allowing Private Rights of Action<br />
As indicated, private rights of action as a supplement—and sometimes even an alternative—to<br />
governmental actions are common in many areas of the law, and copyright and trademark law are<br />
no exception, both in the US and elsewhere. 5 The usual reason cited for allowing such actions is<br />
the increased level of enforcement such actions provide, particularly when governmental resources<br />
are scarce, as they almost always are. On a more philosophical level, allowing private parties who<br />
are the primary beneficiaries of enforcement of statutory rights to bear the cost of vindicating those<br />
rights also arguably aligns costs and benefits associated with the granting of such rights in a way<br />
that is superior to the alignment of costs and benefits associated with governmental actions to<br />
vindicate the same rights. These benefits have particularly been noted in cases of foreign-based<br />
cybercrime. 6 Moreover, private rights of action may actually raise fewer threats to civil liberties<br />
than governmental action, particularly with respect to First Amendment and related limitations on<br />
governmental power. 7 The private right of action provisions of SOPA and PIPA were heavily<br />
criticized when the bills were first introduced, 8 but as time went on, the primary focus of the<br />
criticism shifted to their provisions granting immunity from liability to intermediaries for voluntarily<br />
complying with the demands of private rightsholders seeking to deny intermediary services to<br />
rogue websites. That subject is philosophically distinct from granting rightsholders a private cause<br />
of action and is treated elsewhere in this White Paper. 9<br />
C. Potential Targets for and Limitations on Private Rights of Action<br />
As described in the section of this White Paper on “Remedies,” 10 a private right of action could<br />
potentially run against three different groups: Predatory Foreign Websites, intermediaries, and<br />
consumers. As that section explains, actions against consumers are problematic in a variety of ways,<br />
but actions against PFWs and actions against intermediaries serving such websites are more<br />
promising. 11 Recall that under SOPA and PIPA, the private right of action ran only against a rogue<br />
site itself (specifically, its registrant, owner/operator(s) and/or its domain name, depending on<br />
which of the above could successfully be served), with intermediaries subject to service of any<br />
resulting cease and desist order then having a free-standing obligation to cease doing business with<br />
the relevant site, subject to a motion to compel in the same court that granted such order. 12 This<br />
proposal was subject to criticism from both opponents and supporters of the legislation. Opponents<br />
expressed concern that the system encouraged intermediaries, through excessive grants of immunity<br />
for complying with such orders, not to object to service of the cease and desist orders, while<br />
proponents expressed concern about the lack of judicial economy associated with the prospect of<br />
large numbers of drawn-out lawsuits between rightsholders and accused rogue sites, which would<br />
threaten to render any subsequent relief from intermediaries too little, too late.<br />
To respond to both criticisms, the IPL Section recommends a hybrid solution, by which<br />
rightsholders would be allowed to seek direct remedies directly against PFWs (who would have<br />
notice and an opportunity to be heard, including as to any objection to being characterized as a<br />
PFW) and direct remedies against one or more of the U.S. intermediaries identified above. 13 This<br />
provides full due process rights to the alleged PFW, both in cases where it is sued directly and in<br />
cases where its status as a PFW is critical to the issuance of an injunction against one or more of the<br />
intermediaries that it uses. Such a procedure is a little less convenient for rightsholders, but it<br />
allows the site itself the maximum due process to defend itself against both the onus of being