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Private Enforcement Actions<br />

labeled as a PFW (and resulting liability) and the cutoff of financial support from U.S. intermediaries.<br />

Assuming such a procedure in fact strikes the appropriate balance between the rights of<br />

rightsholders, the rights of accused PFWs and the rights of the site’s intermediaries, the question<br />

then becomes whether there should be additional limitations on such private enforcement actions. 14<br />

D. Limitations on Court Orders against Intermediaries<br />

As noted above, absent guidance from Congress, courts have crafted their own set of court orders<br />

compelling intermediaries. Frequently these court orders have proceeded on an ex parte basis,<br />

often even before notice was provided to defendant parties. The IPL Section also believes that<br />

intermediaries subject to these orders should be able to defend against the orders on the basis of<br />

burden, technical feasibility and effectiveness, just as they could have had under SOPA and PIPA,<br />

as well as under §512(j) of the DMCA, or Article 8(3) in the EU.<br />

Beyond these limitations, the IPL Section believes that the usual rules for civil litigation under the<br />

F.R.C.P. should apply, e.g., with respect to each side bearing its own costs and expenses (i.e., no feeshifting),<br />

and with the intermediary bearing any costs associated with compliance with a court’s<br />

order. 15<br />

IV.<br />

CONCLUSIONS<br />

Based on the analysis explained above, the IPL Section recommends that a private right of action<br />

be included in any legislative solution that is proposed in the House or in the Senate to redress<br />

online piracy and/or counterfeiting undertaken by PFWs.<br />

Notes<br />

1. Both SOPA and PIPA provided for private rights of action as well as for actions by federal enforcement<br />

agencies, albeit not for all of the new causes of action enabled by the bills. See §4 of PIPA and §103 of SOPA<br />

(each providing for private rights of action with respect to payment processors and advertising networks, but not<br />

ISPs and search engines). The predecessor COICA bill, however, provided only for actions by the Department<br />

of Justice, a feature that was praised in some congressional testimony. See, e.g., Statement of Thomas M. Dailey,<br />

Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Verizon Communications, Inc. Before the U.S. Senate Committee<br />

on the Judiciary, Senate Hr’g 112-47 “Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing American Intellectual Property,”<br />

at 10 (Feb. 16, 2011) (“[W]e think the limitation [in COICA] that ISPs will be required to take action only<br />

pursuant to a judicial order issued in a lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice will help ensure COICA is<br />

narrowly invoked.”) (available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67443/pdf/CHRG-<br />

112shrg67443.pdf).<br />

2. See, e.g., Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (2012) (providing standing for “any person<br />

who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” to sue for<br />

treble damages); 15 U.S.C.§77k (2012) (providing standing for any purchaser of a security offered pursuant to<br />

an initial public offering with respect to which its registration statement contained an untrue statement of a<br />

material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements<br />

therein not misleading, to sue for single damages); 18 U.S.C. §1964 (2012) (providing standing to sue for treble<br />

damages for “any person injured in his business or property” by reason of anything actionable under the RICO<br />

statutes, subject to certain exceptions). The Supreme Court has described Congress’ purpose in making such<br />

grants of standing as follows: “By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the<br />

amount of their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as ‘private attorneys general.’” Hawaii v.<br />

Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (available at http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/<br />

us/405/251/case.html).<br />

3. See Combating Online Infringements Act (“COICA”), S. 3804, 111th Cong., §2 (2010) (available at<br />

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3804rs/pdf/BILLS-111s3804rs.pdf).<br />

4. See, e.g., Testimony of Scott Turow, President of the Author’s Guild, Before the U.S. Senate Committee<br />

on the Judiciary, at S. Hrg. 112-47 “Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing American Intellectual Property,” at<br />

49

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