Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf

counsel another argues a will to know his designs, or to gain some
other good to himself; which, as I said before, is of every man's will
the proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it
be, he that asketh it cannot in equity accuse or punish it: for to ask
counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall
think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his
sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) when he asketh it, cannot
in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the
opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate.
For if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the
debate be ended, they should neither ask nor take any further counsel;
for sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and end of
all deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel is author of
it, and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot,
no man else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another to do
anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from
evil intention or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the
Commonwealth; because ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where
every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.
Exhortation, and dehortation is counsel, accompanied with signs in
him that giveth it of vehement desire to have it followed; or, to
say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorteth
doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and
tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning, but encourages him
he counselleth to action: as he that dehorteth deterreth him from
it. And therefore they have in their speeches a regard to the common
passions and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make
use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory,
to persuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of
following their advice.
From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation
is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him
that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by
the definition of counsel, ought to regard, not his own benefit, but
his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own
benefit is manifest enough by the long and vehement urging, or by
the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and
consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed
principally to his own benefit, and but accidentally to the good of
him that is counselled, or not at all.
Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only
where a man is to speak to a multitude, because when the speech is
addressed to one, he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more
rigorously than can be done in a multitude; which are too many to
enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently
to them all at once.
Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required
to give counsel, are corrupt counsellors and, as it were, bribed by
their own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good,
yet he that gives it is no more a good counsellor than he that
giveth a just sentence for a reward is a just judge. But where a man
may lawfully command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an
army, his exhortations and dehortations are not only lawful, but
also necessary and laudable: but when they are no more counsels, but
commands; which when they are for execution of sour labour,
sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requireth to be sweetened in