Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf

have this added: that every man is bound by nature, as much as in
him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself
protected in time of peace. For he that pretendeth a right of nature
to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to
destroy him by whose strength he is preserved: it is a manifest
contradiction of himself. And though this law may be drawn by
consequence from some of those that are there already mentioned, yet
the times require to have it inculcated and remembered.
And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that
the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of
time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what
is conquest; nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his
laws: therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the
point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that
point wherein, having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth,
either by express words or by other sufficient sign, to be his
subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have
shown before in the end of the twenty-first Chapter; namely, that
for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an
ordinary subject, it is then when the means of his life is within
the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then that he hath
no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party
for his contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is
everywhere, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance
to the enemy, esteemed lawful; a total submission, which is but an
assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a
man consider that they submit, assist the enemy but with part of their
estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is
no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance, but
rather a detriment, to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation
of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier,
then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as
the old one keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence,
either in his armies or garrisons: for in this case, he cannot
complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier. But
when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection
wheresoever he has most hope to have it, and may lawfully submit
himself to his new master. And so much for the time when he may do
it lawfully, if he will. It therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly
bound to be a true subject: for a contract lawfully made cannot
lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to
be conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a
conqueror consisteth: for this submission is it implieth them all.
Conquest is not the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory,
of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain is
overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken and put into prison or
chains is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy,
and may save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of
obedience hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered and
a subject; and not before. The Romans used to say that their general
had pacified such a province, that is to say, in English, conquered
it; and that the country was pacified by victory when the people of it
had promised imperata facere, that is, to do what the Roman people
commanded them: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be
either express or tacit: express, by promise; tacit, by other signs.
As, for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an