Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf

Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being
bishop of the capital city of the Empire, and seat of the emperor,
claimed to be equal to him), it followeth that all other bishops
have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein
they exercise the same: and as for that cause they have not their
authority de jure divino; so neither hath the Pope his de jure divino,
except only where he is also the civil sovereign.
His fifth argument is this: "If bishops have their jurisdiction
immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can
do nothing contrary to God's ordination"; and this consequence is good
and well proved. "But," saith he, "the Pope can do this, and has
done it." This also is granted, so he do it in his own dominions, or
in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power;
but not universally, in right of the popedom: for that power belongeth
to every Christian sovereign, within the bounds of his own empire, and
is inseparable from the sovereignty. Before the people of Israel
had, by the commandment of God to Samuel, set over themselves a
king, after the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civil
government; and none but he could make nor depose an inferior
priest. But that power was afterwards in the king, as may be proved by
this same argument of Bellarmine; for if the priest, be he the high
priest or any other, had his jurisdiction immediately from God, then
the king could not take it from him; for he could do nothing
contrary to God's ordinance. But it is certain that King Solomon
deprived Abiathar the high priest of his office,* and placed Zadok
in his room.*(2) Kings therefore may in the like manner ordain and
deprive bishops, as they shall think fit, for the well governing of
their subjects.
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* I Kings, 2. 26, 27
*(2) Ibid., 2. 35
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His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction de
jure divino, that is, immediately from God, they that maintain it
should bring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none.
The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it.
But it is an argument no less good to prove the Pope himself to have
no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.
Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two Popes,
Innocent and Leo; and I doubt not but he might have alleged, with as
good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since St.
Peter: for, considering the love of power naturally implanted in
mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the
same opinion. Nevertheless, they should therein but do as Innocent and
Leo did, bear witness of themselves, and therefore their witness
should not be good.
In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is that the
Pope is not lord of all the world; the second, that the Pope is not
lord of all the Christian world; the third, that the Pope, without his
own territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction directly. These three
conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is that the Pope has, in
the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power indirectly:
which is denied; unless he mean by indirectly that he has gotten it by
indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand that
when he saith he hath it indirectly, he means that such temporal
jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a
consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not