Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf
Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf
Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf
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For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil than the text, and<br />
therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such<br />
interpretation. And therefore unless there be an interpreter<br />
authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not<br />
to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges,<br />
in the same manner as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and<br />
their sentences are to be taken by them that plead for laws in that<br />
particular case, but not to bind other judges in like cases to give<br />
like judgements. For a judge may err in the interpretation even of<br />
written laws; but no error of a subordinate judge can change the<br />
law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign.<br />
In written laws men use to make a difference between the letter<br />
and the sentence of the law: and when by the letter is meant<br />
whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, it is well<br />
distinguished. For the significations of almost all are either in<br />
themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may<br />
be drawn in argument to make many senses; but there is only one<br />
sense of the law. But if by the letter be meant the literal sense,<br />
then the letter and the sentence or intention of the law is all one.<br />
For the literal sense is that which the legislator intended should<br />
by the letter of the law be signified. Now the intention of the<br />
legislator is always supposed to be equity: for it were a great<br />
contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought<br />
therefore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a<br />
reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature; or if the<br />
case be difficult, to respite judgement till he have received more<br />
ample authority. For example, a written law ordaineth that he which is<br />
thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force. It<br />
happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning<br />
is kept out by force, in which case there is no special law<br />
ordained. It is evident that this case is contained in the same law;<br />
for else there is no remedy for him at all, which is to be supposed<br />
against the intention of the legislator. Again, the word of the law<br />
commandeth to judge according to the evidence. A man is accused<br />
falsely of a fact which the judge himself saw done by another, and not<br />
by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the letter of the<br />
law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the<br />
judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses, because the<br />
letter of the law is to the contrary; but procure of the sovereign<br />
that another be made judge, and himself witness. So that the<br />
incommodity that follows the bare words of a written law may lead<br />
him to the intention of the law, whereby to interpret the same the<br />
better; though no incommodity can warrant a sentence against the<br />
law. For every judge of right and wrong is not judge of what is<br />
commodious or incommodious to the Commonwealth.<br />
The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is<br />
to say, in a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate;<br />
namely, the study of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice<br />
of the fact from none but the witnesses, so also he ought to take<br />
notice of the law from nothing but the statutes and constitutions of<br />
the sovereign, alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some<br />
that have authority from the sovereign power to declare them; and need<br />
not take care beforehand what he shall judge; for it shall be given<br />
him what he shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he<br />
shall say in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings<br />
show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of<br />
Parliament in England were judges, and most difficult causes have been