Hobbes - Leviathan.pdf

Lacedaemonians that subdued them, the thirty tyrants: as also to
call the condition of the people under the democracy, liberty. A
tyrant originally signified no more, simply, but a monarch. But when
afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was
abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did
before, but with it the hatred which the popular states bore towards
it: as also the name of king became odious after the deposing of the
kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men to conceive some
great fault to be signified in any attribute that is given in despite,
and to a great enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with
those that have the administration of the democracy, or aristocracy,
they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger
in; but call readily the one anarchy, and the other oligarchy, or
the tyranny of a few. And that which offendeth the people is no
other thing but that they are governed, not as every one of them would
himself, but as the public representant, be it one man or an
assembly of men, thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government:
for which they give evil names to their superiors, never knowing (till
perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary
government, such war must be perpetual; and that it is men and arms,
not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.
And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in
a well-ordered Commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws. What
man that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read,
does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill
or hurt him when he obeyeth not Or that believes the law can hurt
him; that is, words and paper, without hands and swords of men And
this is of the number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as
oft as they like not their governors, to adhere to those that call
them tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them: and
yet they are many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy.
There is another error in their civil philosophy (which they never
learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen), to
extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the
very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination and inquisition
of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech
and actions. By which men are either punished for answering the
truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for
fear of punishment. It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to
employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him if
he be content to preach such and such doctrines; and, in case of
refusal, may deny him the employment: but to force him to accuse
himself of opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, is
against the law of nature; and especially in them who teach that a man
shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments, if he die in a
false opinion concerning an article of the Christian faith. For who is
there (that knowing there is so great danger in an error) whom the
natural care of himself compelleth not to hazard his soul upon his own
judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in
his damnation
For a private man, without the authority of the Commonwealth; that
is to say, without permission from the representant thereof, to
interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics:
but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen
philosophers. For none of them deny but that in the power of making
laws is comprehended also the power of explaining them when there is
need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are law,