i Patrick W. Staib Anthropology This dissertation is approved, and it ...

This arrangement had the potential to benefit the nation as a whole, private
farmers and campesinos alike. However, the results were not as expected largely due to
distrust of the Sandinista leadership on the part of capitalist farmers and the
“decapitalization” of farm assets (described below). Initially, agricultural production on
large-scale farms was supposed to continue while the government stockpiled surplus
crops to incorporate into social services, the monetary system, or whatever seemed fit.
There was no attempt to socialize private farms. They were free to operate in the
international trade system. The Sandinista government determined the amounts that
indicated a surplus of production and then intended to purchase their surpluses in order to
centralize them through ENABAS (the Nicaraguan National Enterprise of Basic
Foodstuffs). That measure seemed intimidating to private farmers (Collins 1982).
Enabling the national economy to recover after years of warfare depended on
motivating private growers to revive and increase production after the FSLN victory.
However, changes in labor policies discouraged private farmers’ efforts. For example,
peasant workers were now free to sell their labor to whomever they chose. Private
farmers had to offer competitive wages, and the minimum wage law also threatened
profits. The consistent devaluation of the Nicaraguan monetary unit, the Córdoba,
discouraged private farmers from participating in the national economy. Farmers and
landholders opted out of reinvesting in the national economy and instead decided to
“decapitalize” their surpluses and capital. Rather than selling crops to the government or
using their machinery for increased productivity, farmers could liquidate their assets and
invest in U.S. dollars.
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