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TWO PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF THE MORAL<br />

SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE BORDERS<br />

Thomas Weitner<br />

Fakultät für Philologie; Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany<br />

e-mail: thomas.weitner@rub.de<br />

Most people, especially politicians, attach great moral weight to state boundaries. Concerning<br />

issues of economic, foreign or immigration policy, it is taken for granted that the interests of<br />

our compatriots take priority in comparison to the interests of foreigners. Following this<br />

maxim, foreigners are excluded from the territory of a state, the scope of social security<br />

systems like health care and unemployment insurance is limited to fellow countrymen and the<br />

right to vote is denied to non-citizens, to name only a few examples.<br />

Philosophers usually invoke two conflicting theories in order to justify the moral significance<br />

of state borders and the priority for compatriots, respectively. The theory of instrumental<br />

value says, that state borders carry moral weight only in a derivative sense. According to this<br />

approach, the state-system, ideally conceived, is a better means to protect the basic human<br />

rights of every person globally than any other political system (e.g. a world state). All special<br />

duties to compatriots can therefore be reduced to general moral duties, which we owe in<br />

principle to anyone in the world. On the other hand the theory of intrinsic value argues, that<br />

the relationship between the members of a state is of moral importance. Since we do not share<br />

this relationship with foreigners, there are special duties to fellow citizens, which are not<br />

reducible to general duties.<br />

I try to resolve the dispute between the two views by demonstrating, that neither of them is<br />

sufficient to give us a plausible justification of the moral significance of state borders by<br />

itself. While the theory of instrumental value is well-suited in the field of human rights, the<br />

theory of intrinsic value is more useful when it comes to the field of justice. Therefore, both<br />

of them have to be combined, in order to yield a robust philosophical theory, which can<br />

justify at least some degree of national partiality.

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