HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA

GÖRGEY, LEE, AND PERCEPTIONS 71also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by othermeans."Consequently, Görgey saw Hungary's salvation as being a defensive proposition,not an offensive one. To conquer Austria was out of the question. Hehad to keep Hungarian independence alive, which could be achieved only byinducing the West to intervene or by compelling Austria to abandon thecontest and seek a negotiated settlement. Kossuth had staunchly based hispolicy on the former. Görgey, a soldier, realized that without Western supportthe struggle could not be won; however, he was not prepared to risk thefortunes of Hungary on the uncertainties of Europe, but rather, to force theissue with Austria as long as Hungarian human, material, and spiritualresources could absorb the strain. Görgey believed the events of 14 Aprilnegated any assistance against Austria. 29 He also knew Austria's main problemwas tactical - they had to defeat Hungary's armed forces, subdue the willof its people, and occupy the country. Such a solution could be achieved onlyby force of arms. Görgey understood the difficulty of this undertaking andcorrectly assumed that Austria could not accomplish this objective withoutRussian support. Therefore, when Nicholas made the decision to assist Austriaand send 190,000 Russian troops into Hungary, Görgey knew that he had toforce quickly the issue with Austria before the Russian action would dictate afinal settlement.Retreat and SurrenderThe combined forces Hungary faced in the summer of 1849 numbered over360,000 soldiers. Görgey's army consisted of about 62,000 troops. Haynau'sArmy of the Danube included four army corps and a Russian infantrydivision, loaned from Paskevich, and enjoyed a total strength of 83,000 menand 330 artillery pieces. 30 On 23 June Görgey convinced ministers and seniormilitary officers to concentrate forces around Komárom in a last ditch effortto defeat the Austrians before they joined with the Russian troops enteringHungary from the north. Görgey rejected Dembinski's immediate plan to gosouth to Szeged since his army at Komárom was further from Szeged thaneither the Russians at Miskolc or the Austrians on the Czonczó line. Hebelieved Dembinski could not execute an offensive against either enemywithout immediately facing an engagement by both forces. 31 Komárom offeredthe Hungarians a base to supply repeated attacks on the Austrians as long assupplies and morale lasted. 32 Interior lines favored Görgey's Komárom plan;Komárom was closer to his supply lines. But the campaign's failure andGörgey's injury determined that the war should go to Szeged.