Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORTthis area which was devoid of vegetation andlivelihood options. All in all, a situation is not goingto help conservation as new settlers find that survivalis not possible without forests and old settlers arefurther displaced to look for more land to cultivate. 7The quality of relocationIt is also clear that relocation requires money,facilities, administrative skills and commitment fromthe implementing agencies. It is important to notethat if this relocation is not ‘satisfactory’, it leads togreater anger and alienation of the local peopletowards the sanctuary; it makes the next effort forrelocation even more difficult, for people, aware ofthe past experience, stoutly resist. Most of all, theconservation imperative becomes even more difficultwhen people have no option but to turn to aprotected area for their survival once again. Theexercise virtually ends up defeating its own purpose.An example of relocation: SariskaThe quality of relocation in the country has mostlyverged on being disastrous. For instance, the onevillage that was relocated from Sariska tiger reservein Rajasthan found itself in such poor conditions thatall the villagers returned to the original village insidethe forest. Now, when agencies are keen to move theremaining villages from the core, there is resistanceand deep suspicion. Researcher Radhika Johari, adoctoral student at the department of anthropology,York University, USA, reports of her conversationwith villagers within the reserve, who recalled theviolent efforts of the administration to evict nonrevenuevillages from the core area. The villagers atKraska spoke of how they were offered land by theforest department in a village located outside thecore area, how they relinquished their landownershipcertificates, only to face opposition fromthe existing residents of the village and to find thatthe land allotted was hilly and unsuitable. They soldoff this land at low prices and returned to the forest,where they were declared illegal by the forestdepartment. When they refused to move, thedepartment used force to evict them. All thisirreversibly destroyed the relations between theauthorities and the people and also left enoughresentment and bad memories to fuel resistance tofurther relocation. 8Retired foresters V D Sharma and R G Soni, andRajendra Singh of Tarun Bharat Sangh, in theirsubmissions to the Tiger Task Force, explained thatthe process followed was extremely faulty. The landwas allotted only on paper but when the settlers wentto the village, the revenue officials in charge of theentire relocation programme did not hand over theland. In fact, the land was then taken over by a fewinfluential people. 9But it is also important to note that relocation ofkey villages from within the core zone — a highpriority tiger habitat — would be important forconservation. A J T Johnsingh of the WildlifeInstitute of India, who has worked for long in thishabitat, argues that the area of ‘Core-I’ is capable ofsustaining both prey and tiger species. Therefore, hesuggests that relocation, particularly of Umri village(which has 26 families and a high livestockpopulation) would be an important step ahead. 10 Theproblem is to rebuild the confidence of villagers andto repair the broken relationship between villagersand protectors, which has in no small measurecontributed to the disaster in the reserve.It is only more recently that there have beeninstances where implementing agencies have gonebeyond what is technically required to give people apackage, which is both satisfactory to them and helpsrebuild their livelihoods. But even here, success ishard to come by. Firstly, this work demands thatother agencies — from irrigation to education —coordinate their activities with the forestdepartment. Secondly, it demands long-term work toensure that all the facilities needed are provided.Thirdly, and most critically, it needs careful andsensitive working with affected people so that theyare fully engaged in the process.An example of relocation: KunoRelocation in Kuno wildlife sanctuary in MadhyaPradesh, being developed as a site to introduce theAsiatic lion from Gir in Gujarat, was plannedcarefully. A total of 19 villages — 1,400 families —were resettled to the outskirts of the sanctuary. Theinhabitants were mostly poor, forest-dependentSahariya tribals. The package was based on a Centralscheme — the beneficiary oriented scheme for tribaldevelopment — which considers every male above18 years, and provides a compensation of Rs 1 lakhper family, for all the services and facilities needed.In 1997, the Union ministry of environment andforests cleared the use of 3,721 ha of forest land forrehabilitation. This was inadequate, so an additional1,283 ha of land was given for relocation in 2000.Researchers from the Samrakshan Trust found that inmany villages, there were complaints regarding thequality of the land and its clearance, but these weresorted out over time. They found the rehabilitationprocess had both negative and positive fallouts — theland in the sanctuary which the people hadcultivated was of a much better quality and had gooddrainage facilities, so they were not satisfied with theallotted land. On the other hand, it was also a factthat there was greater degree of equality in theallotted area, with every family receiving 2 ha ofland. Health, education and communicationfacilities were better in the new area, although94 The way ahead