Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORThold very similar positions and experiences. It is forthis reason the wildlife sector has become extremelyinsular and exclusive, losing its ability to envisionthe bigger challenges that confront it.Secondly, the deliberations and decisions of theBoard and the steering committee should be madeavailable to all. This will help engage a much largerconstituency and will also provide supervision. TheBoard and the committee must also strengthen theirsupervision and monitoring functions so that theycan perform as key institutions of management inthis sector.3. Strengthen the role of the Project Tigerdirectorate in monitoring and coordination. Convertit into the Project Tiger Authority by giving itadministrative autonomy. Project Tiger shouldreport annually to the Indian Parliament so thatpolitical commitment to the project deepens.Independent monitoring reports commissioned bythe body should be available publicly and used fordecision-making with states.The directorate of Project Tiger must have theinternal capacity to both coordinate and guide theeffective implementation of the programme.Currently, the office is understaffed and underequippedto handle the range of work that isnecessary (see Annexure IX: Investing in institutionsfor change: strengthening the Project Tigerdirectorate). The Task Force has reviewed thepresent work load and is suggesting that the ProjectTiger directorate should be converted into a statutoryauthority — the Project Tiger Authority.The following must be done to strengthen therole of the directorate:1. To ensure that states follow the guidelines andprescriptions laid down for the project, a systemof having a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’(MoU) with the project states should be instituted.Any deviation or default from the MoU should bereported to the steering committee.2. Considering the multifarious nature of workhandled by the director, Project Tiger, it is essentialto strengthen the directorate with autonomy. Thedirectorate at present comprises of one director (ofthe rank of inspector general of forests), a jointdirector, one section officer, one personalsecretary, one accountant, a lower division clerkand a peon. The directorate should have at leasttwo deputy inspector general-level officers (one forgeneral and the other for technical work) to assistthe director, apart from other professionals. Thereshould also be scope for contractual arrangementswith scientific institutions like the NationalRemote Sensing Agency, the Forest Survey ofIndia, the Wildlife Institute of India anduniversities to foster field research.3. The director, Project Tiger, should be delegatedpowers to deal with states under Section (3) ofthe Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, especially forthe enforcement of Project Tiger guidelines.4. The role of director, Project Tiger, should notremain confined to tiger reserves, but needs to beextended to other crucial forest areas as wellwhich have viable tiger populations.5. The Project Tiger directorate should berestructured and made into an administrativeauthority at the outset. In the meantime, workshould be initiated to use the statutory precedentof the Central Zoo Authority to establish a‘Project Tiger Authority’. This statutory role willgreatly improve in planning, supervision andmonitoring functions.The directorate must ensure that the followingis done:a. Appointment of key personnel in tiger reservesafter approval from the Centre: This was acondition from the very inception of the project,but has gone into disuse. By creating a strongerprofile and management role for the directorate,states can be persuaded and directed to ensurethat this is done. This is critical because personnelin these reserves must be chosen carefully so thatthey have the credentials and an interest inwildlife conservation, as well as the managementexperience to deal with the larger issues at hand.b. Careful annual analysis of the independentassessment done for each reserve by thedirectorate: This will enable the directorate to notethe performance of each reserve, its personnel andthe state government in protecting tigers. While thehigh performers must be rewarded annually, thelow performers must also be given a reputationalincentive to improve. This can be done by:● Making the report of the independent audit, withits ratings and scores of high and low performers,available as an annual report from the directorateto the Parliament. This will lead to much greaterinvolvement of parliamentarians from differentstates in this work and build a stronger supportbase for the project.● Using the score to reduce financial allocation tothe different reserves. As it clearly will not beadvisable to use financial conditionality in amanner that allows reserves to furtherdeteriorate, it can be used to create conditionsthat improve the working of reserves. However,the Task Force also suggests that any reserve andstate government which receives low scores for aconsecutive period of three years should bepenalised financially as well.32 The way ahead