Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT JOINING THE DOTS ■unreliable and costly.The real problem concerned people’slivelihoods. On the one hand, researchers found cropyields were substantially lower in the new areas,primarily because the land quality, being degradedforest land with little irrigation, was poor. On theother hand, without access to forests, people had lostother sources of revenue and food: from hunting tothe collection of minor forest products like honey,tendu or berries. People also had to leave theirlivestock inside the sanctuary because of the lack offodder sources in the newly settled sites. The peoplehave now shifted from cattle to goats, which againputs a stress on the degraded ecosystem. This ledresearchers to conclude that “in the short run, therehas been a significant decline in livelihood security,which can be directly attributed to displacementfrom resource-rich forests”. This meant that agencieswould need to sustain their investment in therelocation efforts and would require institutionalcapacities to do this development work. 11But the challenge to sustain investment isdifficult. It is, therefore, little surprise that ajournalist writing for the magazine Frontline, whovisited the relocated village of Pehra in 2005, found ahigh order of economic distress and destitution:agricultural productivity had declined and villagerswere forced to migrate for work. Without theresources of the forests, malnutrition had increased,and drinking water was scarce. In resettledPipalbawdi village, people decided to return to theforest for the monsoon crop in 2004. In other words,with all the time and money spent, the work onrelocation could well be lost. 12An example of relocation: BhadraThe Bhadra experience is widely considered a modelfor future relocation in the country and needs to becarefully considered. This 500 sq km area wasdeclared a wildlife sanctuary and tiger reserve in1998 — with an initial notification issued as early asin 1974. The 1992 census found there were 736families in 16 villages located within the sanctuaryarea. 13In 2003, a study conducted by wildliferesearchers found 4,000 people were living insideBhadra — a few had recognised legal status but mostwere ‘encroachers’. Researchers also studied theimpact of human activity and found the villagersdepended on firewood and minor forest productcollection for their livelihoods. When they modelledthe use pattern, they estimated the total area affectedby intensive human activity around the 13 villagesthey studied was about 12 sq km, in addition to thearea of the villages. The total area affected by humanactivity was computed at 53.70 sq km — roughly 11per cent of the total area of the sanctuary. 14The people’s initial reaction to relocation washostile. On the one hand, park authorities increasedpressure on people to leave the sanctuary by seizingall firewood, putting a stop to livestock grazing andclosing the sanctuary gates so that people could notuse the roads. As their harassment increased, peoplebecome more and more angry. Large areas were burnteach year as people deliberately set fire to forests.But park authorities then worked hard to get thepeople involved in relocation and agreed on anattractive and rewarding package. In its officialdocument chronicling the relocation programme, thegovernment of Karnataka says: “…to wax eloquenton conservation to people who are cut off fromcivilisation during monsoons is a ridiculousproposition. After all, these people have been livinghere for over a century. To deny them the right to usethe game roads, to cut fodder for livestock or togather firewood seemed inhuman.” 15The reason why Bhadra is more successful is:● The quality of land given to the settlers isextremely productive and fertile. It is also over50 km away from the sanctuary, so it helps buildnew livelihood opportunities. 16● The quantum of money spent on individualfamilies and services was substantially higherthan what has been sanctioned through theCentral scheme for relocation.● The fact that all settlers — legal or ‘illegal’,landed and landless — were given land in therelocation venue provided a much greaterinterest in relocation.● The government agencies worked carefully tocoordinate the activities between the differentdepartments and, more importantly, ensuredthere was little misappropriation of funds. Thisis also a case where local NGOs played animportant facilitating role.But even here, recent evidence suggests a fewfamilies that received unirrigated land are unhappy.Also, villagers in the fringe of the core area, who areagreeable to relocation, want the same quality ofirrigated land. The question in Bhadra is how will itensure the expectations of these people will be met.If it is not, Bhadra might well witness unrest andtension between park authorities and people.The question remains if the money spent onBhadra — Rs 4.02 lakh per family — would not havebeen utilised to ‘manage’ the impacts within thereserve. After all, research shows that the areaimpacted by human beings was only 11 per cent ofthe reserve. Are these conservation benefits worth it?More importantly, was the decision for relocationtaken after these considerations?The way ahead 95