Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT JOINING THE DOTS ■PERCENTAGE BREAK-UP OF FUNDS SPENT ANDBUDGETED TILL 2003-04Prepare of futureproject (2%)Project managementtravel (2%)Consultants'services (12%)PPF (0%)Unallocated (1%)Village ecodevelopment (57%)PROJECT COST SUMMARYCivil works (20%)Vehicle/Material (6%)Source: World Bank 2002, aid memoire, November 2003, Annexure 3,Budget and Expenditure, mimeoTotal Percentage(US $’000) total basecostsImproved PA management 13,911.7 22Village ecodevelopment 33,825.5 55Develop effective and extensive 4,713.5 8support for ecodevelopmentProject management 5,276.8 9Prepare future biodiversity projects 2,332.6 4Reimbursement of PPF 2,000.0 3Tota baseline costs 62,060.2 100Physical contingencies 1,781.5 3Price contigencies 3,158.3 —Total project costs 67,000.0 108Source: Anon 1996, Staff Appraisal Report, World Bank, Washingtonthe villages here decided to purchase communitylevelassets. The villages invested in tractors, pig andchicken farms, grain sheds and shredders. But inmany villages, the assets came to naught, for theyeither created rifts or led to corrupt practices.These villages suffered from critical defects inproject planning and implementation, which createda new delivery mechanism built around the existingstructures of the forest department. In general,ecodevelopement committees were to be set up aftermaking villages aware about the ecodevelopmentproject. Non-governmental organisations were tocreate awareness and then frame micro-plans inwhich villages were on equal footing with the forestdepartment. In Buxa, for instance, the first attempt atsetting up ecodevelopment committees failedbecause the non-governmental oganisations thedepartment hired were new to this kind ofassociation. The department lost time: this shows upin the number of ecodevelopment committeescreated in each of the five years of the project. Theproject picked up only in the third and the fourthyear, by which time it was about to close (see graph:Forced to spend, ecodevelopment project splurgestowards project closure).Lack of capacity to spendOther sites suffered in a similar manner. A WorldBank Issue Paper of April 10, 2000 — internallyprepared just before the official mid-term review —recorded that a mere 20 per cent of the funds hadbeen disbursed, while 58 per cent of the entireproject time had lapsed. As far as unutilised fundslying with state authorities was concerned, a mere 15per cent of the funds had been used up. As a result,there was enormous pressure to utilise funds, whichin turn led to a scramble to complete projects. 17For instance, in Ranthambhore, the totalsanctioned amount at the beginning of the projectwas Rs 38.38 crore, more than the total money spenton the park in its 30-year history. But the park’sauthorities were unable to start the project, so thetotal allocation was reduced to Rs 20.08 crore, ofwhich the park finally spent Rs 18.75 crore. Themoney was spent in a rush in the last five years of theproject period of eight years, when biogas plantswere made, checkdams contructed and families weredistributed LPG cylinders to wean them away fromfirewood use.Livelihoods versus small assetsThe biggest debate that arose out of the IndiaEcodevelopment Project was what to invest in. Onpaper, everyone was consulted and micro-plans wereprepared, but the people in many places were noteven aware of the possibilities. The project hadFORCED TO SPEND, ECODEVELOPMENT PROJECTSPLURGES TOWARDS PROJECT CLOSUREFunds (rupees in lakh)10,0005,0000113.09Release UtilisedUtilisation in per cent10.651995-199601996-19971997-199850.551998-199981.461999-2000113.092000-20012001-200286.012002-200387.3462.742003-2004120100806040200Utilisation as per cent offunds releasedSource: Anon 2004, Project Tiger office, Union ministry of environment andforests, New delhi, mimeoThe way ahead 125