Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

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TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT JOINING THE DOTS ■COMPARISON OF MONEY SPENT AREA-WISE IN SARISKATO THE COUNTRY’S AVERAGESariskaAverage ofall reservesAnnual average area-wise fund 2.58 1.01allocation in tiger reserves frominception (Rs lakh per sq km)Source: Compiled from Project Tiger directorate dataconcerned. Therefore, it cannot be argued that morefunds are required to solve the problems of thisreserve. Rs 22 crore has been spent on the reservesince its creation in 1978. Assuming there were 22tigers in the reserve (now known to be a grossoverestimation), the reserve has spent Rs 1 crore pertiger over this period. On an average, the countryspent Rs 23.70 lakh per tiger in this 30-year period(2001-02 census estimates). Compared to that,Sariska has spent four times more — but even thishas turned out to be completely inadequate inprotecting the tigers! Also, the funds available toSariska compared to its area are more than doublethe average for all reserves in the country (see table:Comparison of money spent area-wise in Sariska tothe country’s average).3. The evidence also points to the role of‘commercial’ poaching in the area. Investigations bypark authorities reveal that the first case, involvingbig players like Sansar Chand, occurred in 2001when two leopards were killed. Unfortunately,because of the collapse of the park’s management thecase was not investigated fully. The entry of Chandchanged the economics of poaching in Sariska:poachers used to insignificant returns now hadaccess to large amounts of money, paid up front.Interrogation of poachers has revealed that since2002, when three tigers were killed, poaching hasincreased. In 2003, another three were poached andthe last four fell in 2004.4. Increase in poaching has combined withextremely faulty and negligent conduct of tigercensus in the reserve. To add to the chaos, the dailycamp register (which records the sightings of animalsby staff and which helps verify the census) has notbeen maintained properly. As a result, the earlywarning system in the reserve failed. Till 2004, thepark’s managers believed there were above 20 tigers,which they reduced to 16-18 in 2004. But what isnow emerging is that there may have been even fewertigers — six-10 — left in the reserve. Theseeventually fell prey to poachers.5. The breakdown in the park’s defences has beenaided by the extreme hostility existing among localpeople against the park and its tigers. In thesecircumstances, it is not difficult to understand whythe tigers went missing: they were there for thepoachers to take. In its investigations, the CentralBureau of Investigation found that many villagersassisted poachers in killing the tigers and skinningand removing the carcasses.Reports by local NGOs say villagers saw metaltraps, used by poachers, on the main tiger trails.There were instances when guards confrontedpoachers in the park, but were helpless as they werethreatened at gunpoint. Even with working wirelesssets, they could do little. Moreover, their relationswith local people were so strained that they couldnot get any help from the villages. 6Many researchers have recorded the specialrelationship traditionally existing in Sariska betweenthe gujjars, the tiger and nature. But officialinterference and constant intimidation has led tosuch a breakdown that, today, it is widely suspectedvillagers hired the services of traditional huntingcommunities to ‘protect’ themselves and theirlivestock from the tiger. It is important to note herethat the government has no provision for awardingcompensation for livestock killed by animals inside aprotected area.Over the years, the park management has donelittle to resolve these issues. The futile relocationexercise has generated more distrust. The villagerslive in extreme poverty and deal daily with theharassment. They do not have an option. They areforest-dependent householders, who have to use theresources of the reserve — the fodder and the grazinglands — for their survival.When the Tiger Task Force visited Kankwarivillage, located inside the core area and consideredan important tiger breeding ground, it found villagersexisting on the edge of survival. They lack basicresources such as education and medical facilities.They earn their living through livestock breeding,but face immense hardships in their dailyinteractions with the forest department. They are notallowed to carry fodder and other basic material intotheir village. They live as illegal settlers in their ownland. The village is not a revenue village. It is asettlement within the forest, and its rights have neverbeen determined. Therefore, the forest departmenthas never bothered to recognise even the grazinglands the village is entitled to. It is important to notehere that according to the information given to thetask force during its visit to Sariska by park officials,much of the land under the Sariska tiger reserve hasnot been recorded as forest in revenue records. 7The villagers assured the Task Force they wereprepared to relocate, provided they receivedadequate facilities in the new area. But they distrustrelocation immensely, because of their pastThe assessment 17
■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORTexperience. They also complained that authoritieshad backed off after once showing them land forrelocation. This heightened the distrust.5a. It is clear to the Task Force that there is a completebreakdown in relations between the park authoritiesand the settlements within Sariska. It is also clear thatover the years, much more could have been done torelocate people or repair this relationship.5b. The Task Force also finds it strange that the parkadministration has no real idea or estimate of theextent of damage done by settlements within thepark. In fact, there is considerable confusion aboutthe number of livestock and even the number ofhouseholds in villages. It is clear that again, muchmore will have to be done to sort out these issues toadvance future plans for relocation.In this context, it is important to assess theimpact of human populations so that policy can bedesigned. For instance, according to an assessment oftiger reserves in the report prepared by the ForestSurvey of India for Project Tiger, the forest covercomprises 674 sq km — 77 per cent — of the 881 sqkm area that comprises Sariska. Dense andmoderately dense forests cover 44 per cent of theforested area, the rest being open and scrubland.Significantly, the Forest Survey assessment notes thatthere has been little or no change in the forest coverbetween 1997 and 2002. In other words, humanimpact has not resulted in visible deterioration overthis period. Also, according to this assessment, forestcover destruction cannot be the cause ofdisappearance of tigers from Sariska. 86. Over the years, destructive pressures bothwithin the park and outside have led to shrinkageof tiger habitat: it has been brutally mined, grazed onby countless livestock, even as little has beeninvested in protecting and afforesting the landsaround the park. The Wildlife Institute of Indiareport finds that Sariska is an island, with virtuallyno forested habitat in its surroundings (see map:Broad vegetation types of Sariska tiger reserve and itsconnectivity with neighbouring forests). 9 On onehand, the tiger cannot move beyond the park — itshabitat has shrunk drastically. On the other, people’sresources have also shrunk, forcing them to exertmore pressure on the reserve. This is a doublejeopardy for the tiger.BROAD VEGETATION TYPES OF SARISKA TIGER RESERVE AND ITS CONNECTIVITY WITHNEIGHBOURING FORESTSKISHANGARH BASKOTPUTLIBANSURNALWAR FORTProtected areaCities/townsClose forestOpen forestScrubAgriculture/habitationWater bodiesSHAHPURAVIRATNAGARTHANAGAZISARISKAALWARRAMGARHLACHHMANGARHRAJGARHJAMWA RAMGARHBASWAJAMWA RAMGARHDAUSASAKRAISource: WII 2005, Assessment of status of tiger in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun18 The assessment
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Page 4 and 5: ContentsIntroductionExecutive summa
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Wildlife research has been facing s
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04Action plan for changeKey recomme
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05References
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