Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

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TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT JOINING THE DOTS ■TIGER POPULATION AND SIGHTINGS IN SARISKA FROM JANUARY 1997 TO JULY 2004302524 2426 26 262726Tiger numbers or sighting20151050177651997 1998 1999 20001730102001 2002 2003 2004YearsTiger sighting by staffTiger population as per official censusSource: WII 2005, Assessment of status of tiger in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradunentered the reserve on a single day. The number oftourists visiting the park has remained between45,000-60,000 per year (with a decline in 2003-2004to 40,000). The earnings from entry fees collected bythe park authorities and deposited with the stategovernment have been between Rs 28-53 lakhper year. 4Human habitationConservationists believe human habitations withinthe core area of the park are leading to degradationand disturbance of tiger habitat. GhazalaShahabuddin of the New Delhi-based Council forSocial Development, who has conducted anextensive field study in Sariska, says that about 40per cent of ‘Core-I’ is severely degraded, to the pointof being incapable of supporting any prey. 5According to park authorities, besides the 11villages in the core, there are 12 villages inside thesanctuary and five more within the reserve — 28 inall within Sariska’s 881 sq km area. In addition, thereare nearly 200 villages in the vicinity of the park,whose residents use the forest for firewood and forgrazing their animals. Sariska officials do not haveany reliable estimate of the number of livestock inthe villages, or the number of livestock that enter thepark from outside.It is important to note here that Sariska’sofficials, and the state forest department, are largelyresponsible for the problems they encounter indealing with people in and around the reserve:Firstly, till date, they have not completed whatis a pre-requisite for declaring an area a sanctuary ornational park — the recording and settlement of therights of people who live there. In Sariska thisprocess, begun in 1983, remains incomplete.Secondly, the 11 villages in the core area aredenied any form of development — roads, schoolsand even wells. Some years ago, park authoritieseven prohibited residents from practisingagriculture. The move, paradoxically, forced peopleto keep more goats, thus damaging the ecosystemfurther.Thirdly, the rehabilitation of one villageundertaken by the department in the 1970s washandled so ineffectively that many residentsreturned to their original village in the sanctuary.This has led to a crisis of confidence: villagersremember this episode with bitterness. Moreover,villagers of hamlets such as Sirawas and Bandipulhave been relocated to spaces that lack basicfacilities.Fourthly, the department has been ‘working’ onrelocation plans without involving local people atall, thus adding to mistrust. Shahabuddin, who hascompleted a detailed household survey of the 11villages in Core-I, finds authorities have dealt withrelocation in an extremely slipshod and negligentmanner, without taking the local people intoconfidence. In the late 1980s, under a relocationplan, people were shown land situated near a waterbody. But then it was noted that this land was, infact, sanctuary land. So the plan was shelved andrelations between people and the SariskaThe assessment 15
■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORTmanagement soured irreversibly.Researchers working in the park say that as aresult of all this, there is a deep hatred for the tigeramong local people, and mainly among thepastoralist gujjars. The gujjars blame the sanctuaryfor everything — their lack of livelihood, inadequatedevelopment infrastructure in their villages and,most of all, the persistent harassment. This isextremely unfortunate, as these people are forestbasedbuffalo-rearers who have traditionallycoexisted with animals.In her recommendations to the Tiger Task Force,Shahabuddin presents the following action points:a. Complete the recording and settlement of rightsof villages inside the sanctuary, particularly in‘Core-I’;b. Relocate the few villages necessary forconservation, but with the involvement of and inconsultation with villagers and NGOs working inthe area;c. Provide identity cards to all villagers livingwithin the core zone to prevent unauthorisedentry;d. Invest in ecodevelopment programmes to reducethe pressure on habitats and firewoodplantations and ensure payment ofcompensation for injury and livestock losses topeople urgently;e. Share the benefits of tourism with villagers in thepark periphery, in exchange for agreements togive up goat breeding and limiting buffalonumbers; andf. Use the entry fees to the reserve to compensatevillagers for loss of cattle to carnivores and toprovide subsidised fodder for their cattle.Mining interestsMining began in the area in the 1960s; by 1991, therewere over 400 units located mainly within andaround the southern boundary of the reserve. In May1991, Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS), a well-known NGO,filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the SupremeCourt against this mining, which was steadilydestroying tiger habitat. The Court ruled against themines and directed the state government to stopissuing licenses. The Justice M L Jain committee wasset up to prepare a list of the mines within theprotected area, and in November 1991 the Courtreiterated its earlier order of closure.But tensions continued. Rajendra Singh of TBSwas attacked by miners during his visit to the sitewith experts. This led to another PIL, as a result ofwhich a miner was fined and briefly imprisoned. In1992, the Union ministry of environment and forests,responding to the Court directive, issued anotification restricting certain environmentallydamaging activities in specified areas of the Aravallirange. The area of the tiger reserve was included inthe restricted zone. Matters came to a head in 1993when a senior Supreme Court advocate was attackedby miners. The Court responded with a definitiveruling on April 8, 1993, against mining in andaround the reserve.In all this, a few things still remain unknown: didthe closure of the mines fuel the anger of localpeople, now further denied employmentopportunities? What role did the powerful miningcommunity play in poaching of tigers?Sariska: an assessmentThe assessment of the Tiger Task Force — based onits field trip to the reserve in July 2005, a detailedreview of reports and discussions with concernedofficials, researchers and villagers — is as follows:1. It is clear that there was a managementbreakdown in the tiger reserve. During the 1990s, thefield director in charge of the reserve had been inoffice from July 1996. But in September 2003, thestate government upgraded the post of the fielddirector from deputy conservator to conservator andappointed an official as field director. The fielddirector in position found that he was suddenlydowngraded and termed “officer-in-waiting” — aposition he held till February 2004. The new fielddirector continued in this position till September2004. All this was done without any clarity of theroles of the different officials and contributed furtherto management collapse. The deputy director, whotook charge in March 2004, left in June 2004 and hissuccessor was appointed only in September 2004.During the 2004 monsoon period, the assistant fielddirector was in charge of the reserve. Even the fielddirector was on home leave.This confusion and lack of managerial controlwas combined with a collapse of internal systems,including that of recording of animal sightings andpatrolling. There was no supervision of forest guardsto do protection work. Internal roads necessary forsurveillance were not repaired; even the worn-outtyres on the anti-poaching jeep had not beenreplaced. The Project Tiger directorate is on record tothe state government regarding these lapses. TheTiger Task Force, too, noted with distress that eventoday, in spite of the tragedy in the park, Sariska’sofficials were not maintaining records as requiredunder Project Tiger guidelines.2. It is also clear that the tragedy per se is not onlyabout the lack of resources or staff. In fact, anassessment of financial resources and personnelreveals that Sariska ranks above the national averageso far as availability of funds, staff and equipment is16 The assessment
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04Action plan for changeKey recomme
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05References
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