Report of the Tiger Task Force - PRS

■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORTwas set up by the Indian Board for Wildlife (now theNational Board for Wildlife) to recommend ways andmeans of eliciting public support for conservation.The concern was clear: conservation efforts wereincreasing, but policy makers realised there was a“growing degree of apathy and indeed, antipathy,towards wildlife among different classes andsections of the public”, as the report put it in itsintroduction. 2This task force focussed on the issue of thedependence of rural people on forests, and whatconservation-led policing did to this relationship. Itsaid: “Most communities in the neighbourhood ofreserves sustain themselves by eroding marginal landand depleting forest pastures. In their precariousexistence, enforcement of restrictions in wildlifereserves triggers antagonism. That discipline isessential to revive essential life support systems thatthese areas provide is not appreciated for the samereason.” At the same time, the task force also believedcooperation could be possible if the demands ofprotection were backed by reasonable alternatives.The report of this task force, conceived as it wasby a farsighted politician (the member secretary ofthis task force, incidentally, was H S Panwar, also amember of the Tiger Task Force), went on to dosomething unusual in the area of conservation.Instead of blaming people and demanding moreprotection for reserves — a standard demand — thetask force negotiated for better developmentprogrammes and funds for villages located in theperiphery (fringe) of conservation zones. For thispurpose, it recommended the Special Areas forEcodevelopment programme, with higher per capitainputs on development based upon a conservationbias. It also recommended other measures, includingemployment benefits from reserves for local people.Failure to undertake such measures, said thereport, would mean the success of management intiger reserves — the report called them “islands ofconservation” — would be short-lived, irrespectiveof how scientifically it was conceived: “If the landsurrounding such effort — sustained islands —continues to deteriorate in productivity affecting theavailability of resources for the communities, theseislands are bound to succumb one day to thecommunity’s demands.” It also warned these‘islands’ would be inadequate to meet ecologicalimperatives, not being able to function as vibrantgenetic pools.The words of this task force were prophetic.Unfortunately, its recommendations were tardilyimplemented. An ecodevelopment programme,funded later by the World Bank, was initiated in themid-1990s. But it was not conceptualised as adevelopment initiative, but simply as a programmeaimed at putting aside money to wean away villagersfrom using the resources of the protected areas. It didnot invest enough to meet the challenges whichconservation in India faced at that time.It is important to note here that Madhav Gadgil,another member of the Tiger Task Force, madesimilar recommendations in a project report on theNilgiri biosphere reserve (which includes theBandipur tiger reserve) submitted to the Governmentof India in 1981. Gadgil’s report suggested thesespecial areas could serve as laboratories ofconservation-friendly development, with zones ofcooperation around conservation areas andmechanisms for coordination among developmentprogrammes and protected area programmes.Phase three: 1990-2000The turning point in India’s tiger conservationprogramme came in the 1990s. Problems erupted andwere ‘managed’, not solved. This was also a period,like the early 1970s, when international nongovernmentalorganisations (NGOs) were active inpushing policy in the country.By now India had 19 tiger reserves,encompassing 29,716 sq km, with a population of1,327 tigers (1989 tiger census). But as a criticalreview of Project Tiger, carried out in 1993 by theUnion ministry of environment and forests (MoEF),acknowledged: “All in all, Project Tiger faces a newset of problems. Project Tiger saved the tiger fromextinction in the nick of time but over 20 years it isclear that expanding human populations, a new wayof life based on alien models and the resultant effecton natural resources has created fresh problems thatindicate danger for the tiger. Militancy and poachingonly add fuel to the fire. This is a serious and criticalmoment in the history of tiger conservation.” 3In 1994, a Parliamentary Committee on Science,Technology, Environment and Forests recommendedan evaluation of the programme to make it moremeaningful and result-oriented. The committee feltthis was necessary because the “objectives of ProjectTiger have not been achieved in as much the tigerpopulation in the country has registered a decline,poaching still continues in menacing proportions andthe habitat of the tigers seems to have shrunk in area”. 4Following this committee’s recommendations,another high-powered committee headed by J JDutta, former principal chief conservator of forests inMadhya Pradesh, was constituted. The Duttacommittee submitted its report in early 1996. Itexamined issues of management as well as theinterface with local people in reserves. Here was areport that, for the first time, discussed what neededto be done in terms of the legal status of what it called“enclaved villages” — human habitations withinnational parks. Interestingly, it argued that while theremoval of villages from tiger reserves was an ideal4 The assessment