Plant 44 Audit Reports - Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

For Official Use OnlyAFP 44 ANNUAL FACILITIES REVIEWRAYTHEON SYSTEMS COMPANY4-8 FEBRUARY 2008FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW1. PURPOSEThe intent of this facility review was to examine the inspection and testing program forfire protection systems, review the status of the corrective actions of last year'sobservations and identify potential fire protection problems during a walk through of thefacilities. Assisting me with this years fire protection review were Raytheon's DennisTwardowski, Rick Johnson and Jeff George.2. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCERECORDSRecords for the most part are centrally kept with the inspectors and are in good ordershowing that periodic testing and inspections per NFPA are being accomplished with oneconcern.Fire Hydrant isolation valves should be exercised and lubricated annually. While theFire Dept. says they do inspect the isolation valves while annually inspecting/testing thefire hydrants, the inspection description for fire hydrants does not mention anything aboutinspecting the isolation valve in the branch line just ahead of the hydrant. Recommendadding isolation valve inspection as part ofthe fire hydrant inspection or as a separatetask altogether.3. PREVIOUS FACILITY REVIEW CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUSNot all of the corrective actions as a result ofour 2006 facility review report were fieldverified but ofthose reviewed, the corrective actions were adequate with exception of thefollowing repeat observations;3.1 FACO Bldg 852 sprinklers along south corridor too low. The ceiling is used to trapheat and activate the sprinkler heads. With the sprinkler head lowered approx 2 ft belowceiling level, activation could be delayed in a fire event. Our understanding is this taskwill be completed this year (2008).3.2 B-833 new vehicle maintenance addition on west side. We recommended addingsprinklers to this area and it is our understanding that Raytheon has completed thisproject. Additionally when the overhead door is down on the west side of the originalbay, there is no secondary personnel exit for this original bay. We recommend adding asecondary exit. Secondly, when this same overhead door is in the up position, it blocksAttachment 4