gisw13_chapters

This is nothing less than a threat from the government,with cruel disregard for the urgency ofthe abuse victims’ needs. In addition, the government’splan to call up victims’ financial informationand provide proportional support denotes that it isnot mindful of how victims who flee from violenceto seek security in shelters have great difficulty inexercising their legal rights over property.Unfortunately, relevant ministries (Ministry ofHealth and Welfare, Ministry of Gender Equalityand Family) are not aware of how severely victims’rights to the privacy of personal information areviolated.For example, until 2010, vocational trainingfor abuse victims was partially paid for by thegovernment to assist victims’ rehabilitation. However,as part of an electronic government systemestablished in 2011, it was advised that femalevictims also visit the local employment supportcentre to register their personal information, includingtheir RRN, and engage in job-seekingactivities just as any unemployed or job-seekingindividual does.The current law does not mandate women victimsof violence to update their current address intheir resident registration, in order not to disclosetheir location to the perpetrators. However, the victimis required to visit a local employment supportcentre that is in the proximity of the address on theirresident registration, not their current address (i.e.the shelter). There is no consideration for concernsthat a victim may unwillingly expose her location tothe perpetrator, or be accosted by the perpetrator orthe perpetrator’s relatives.This reveals the government’s painful lack of understandingregarding the different needs of socialservice providers and recipients. This also showsthat the government lacks the least understandingof women’s rights, and this even oppresses the victims’future economic and social activity.It is also alarming that collecting victims’ personalinformation increases the possibility ofinformation leaks. As of May 2013, there have beenten cases of personal information leaks since theISWN began. These are only the reported cases inwhich victims were aware of the leak; there couldbe many more leaks that victims are not aware of.This raises the chance of perpetrators attackingthe victim again. Recording the victim’s informationon the ISWN makes it easy for perpetrators to identifyher location. For example, when abused wivesflee from their husbands, they are apt to take theirchildren with them. In fact, prior to the ISWN, therewere cases in which abusive fathers who locatedtheir children through the National Education InformationSystem came to the shelter to threaten theirwives and children.If these abusers access the ISWN, the informationcould precipitate more violent actions. Victimsof sexual abuse are by no means free from thethreats their perpetrators can pose if their personalinformation is compromised.The government should note that due to socialprejudice, most women prefer not to disclose thefact that they have stayed at a shelter. However,when her RRN and personal information are accumulatedinto administrative information, thereis virtually nothing a woman can do to protect herprivacy.To these assertions, the Korean governmentmade the following counterargument: RRNs arereplaced by electronic management numbers thatcannot be matched to a person, so that a personaccessing data cannot identify a person with aRRN. However, this is a flawed argument. Theelectronic management number is not randomlycreated. Rather, it is a serial code that is derivedfrom the victim’s RRN. In addition, the serial codecontains the type and location of the facility wherea victim seeks support. This means that a perpetratorcould derive a victim’s location. Someonemay also discover that a victim had once stayed ata shelter. Further, the serial code can be exposednot only to government officials who process data,but even to officials in other offices. There havebeen reported cases where someone was able toconfirm from a local provincial office clerk that acertain woman had stayed at a shelter. What wouldhappen if such sensitive information, which is sopoorly protected, were released on the internet atonce?For the above reasons, the Korea Sexual ViolenceRelief Centre has refused to disclose femalevictims’ personal information to the government atthe cost of losing subsidies. They have come up withalternatives, which include raising funds throughinternet portal sites and using social network servicessuch as Twitter to promote their activities andattract sponsors.ConclusionsFrom the above examples, we can see that the internetitself presents neither a positive nor negativeeffect on women per se; rather, it is how the socialgovernance structure allocates internet technologythat affects women’s rights.166 / Global Information Society Watch