PLEASE NOTE: This book contains graphic description ... - HUNSOR

The approximate summary of the massacres originates from brave priests, who turnedwith their experiences to the authority accessible to them, the Cardinal of Esztergom, the PrincePrimate Jozsef Mindszenty; they expected some help. The Cardinal addressed a letter to theHungarian Foreign Minister, who was making preparations for the peace negotiations, and wroteabout the massacre of 40,000-50,000 innocent Hungarians in Bacska.Foreign Minister Janos Gyongyosi, as far as I know, never took advantage of this reportin any of his speeches, memorandas, negotiations, though it is certain that he shared the contentsof the Cardinal's letter with at least his party and the significant persons of his coalitiongovernment.It is probable, that nobody dared to accuse the highly respected Josip Broz Tito. In theWest and in the East the guerilla leader was esteemed so highly, that it was impossible even tomention any of the genocides committed by his troops and gangs of partisans on Croatians,Slovenians, Germans or Hungarians.The grievances suffered by Hungarians in Bacska in 1944 did not even turn up during thetrials dealing with the atrocities of the Hungarian Counter Intelligence police at Novi Sad nor inthe peace negotiations.It is characteristic of the humiliating fear of the democratic Hungarian government, thatPrime Minister Ferenc Nagy in the beginning of 1947, was required to deliver about 3,5OOinhabitants of Bacska to the Yugoslavian authorities; they were regarded as fugitives. Inaddition, he gave opportunity and permission for a far reaching OZNA investigation onHungarian territory. The majority of the fugitives handed over to the Serbians were executed.Was Ferenc Szombathelyi, former chief of the general staff, aware of the annihilation ofmany thousands of Hungarians in Bacska? He wanted to deny his responsibility for the themassacre at Novi Sad in the 1945 autobiographical memoranda before being arrested, by theAmerican authorities for war crimes."In the bloody events at Novi Sad and Bacska, writes143Szombathelyi, a great many Hungarians, especially the right wingers and most of the staffofficers, saw a great national exploit. They thought of the events as strong arm measures,normal under special guerilla wartime conditions. Unfortunately, I could not alter the situation,because the events had been so horrible that I could not turn to the public with them nor could Irelease any propaganda statements. The public opinion of the country was entirely under theinfluence of right wing propaganda, and developed in accordance with it. I would not havethought that the events at Novi Sad had been so terrible, and for a long time I did not believe so,though I never made the mistake of regarding the events at Novi Sad as exploits. I had beenconvinced for a long time, that there had been a justified reprisal by the troops, which would putan end to Serbian atrocities committed against the Hungarian public security; the administrativeorganisations; and property damages.There would be peace at last on this land, which was disturbed by the Serbs and not us, becausethey did not intend to sympathize with our peaceful and tolerant administration based on theideas of St. Stephen. What is more they opposed it completely.In contrast with all the others, I believed the reports of the responsible commanders,namely Generals Feketehalmy-Czeydner and Grassy, who had led the events on the spot, andwhom I had known as honest, reliable soldiers up till now. They constantly denied in writing, as