PLEASE NOTE: This book contains graphic description ... - HUNSOR

well as in words, that there had been bloodshed. If occasionally debauchery had taken place, thereason for that had plainly been the provocative behaviour of the Serb population. I could neverget a report from them of the number and identity of the casualties, but they denied that manyhad been killed, and that women and children had been among them.I thought I had been delivered an exaggerated report by the civil service. Civil servants getfrightened easily, and cry for the armed forces. When the armed forces take severe measures,which cause casualties, they grow even more frightened and would prefer to declineresponsibility. They regard the events as ones which did not happen at all.Considering the international situation mainly in relation to Germany; the Serbian internecinemassacres of the partisan movements within our borders; what the Serbs had to suffer at thehands of the German and Croatian troops; and consequently developing homicidal psychosis, Idid not find it wise nor did I find the time convenient to call attention to such a scandalous case,which would have completely ruined the peace of the whole country. The government refused tostir up the matter. I was too144young a chief to risk such a great battle on my own, which much later, after having discoveredthe truth entirely, I lost. I laid the matter aside in accordance with government wishes; I pleadedfor its shelving by the Regent.I did not initiate the mopping up operation at Novi Sad; it was the Ministry of the Interiorwith whom I maintained close contact throughout the whole operation in Bacska. I informedthem of everything I learned from the military line. When he reported to me, I orderedFeketehalmy-Czeydner to personally report to the Minister for Home Affairs and to the PrimeMinister. He had been briefed by both Ministers before the operation at Novi SadAfter the events at Novi Sad, my conviction grew firm, that attrocities had taken placeon the part of the military forces. Eventually I had to acknowledge the fact, that I had beenmisled by the reports, and my subordinates could be accused with dereliction of duty andnegligence.On the basis of police reports; private information; and the conclusions reached by myattorneys; it was beyond doubt, that an awful crime had been committed.The crime had not only taken the lives of wretched Serbian casualties, but we Hungarians alsohad to suffer a terrible blow. As a commanding officer, I could only declare it a real "nationalcatastrophe". This realization caused me a terrible disappointment in my respected comrades andstaff officers. When I reached the end of the road of sorrowful realization, I acted firmly andmercilessly. I transformed the whole matter into a personal one; I put the matter before the courtof the chief of staff. Although my Prosecutor was against it, I made a charge of disloyalty.I did not want too much publicity nor did I want to burden anybody with this difficult case,which lived on in the public opinion as a falsely interpreted national act of heroism. I did notfind anybody else with the necessary strength fit to settle the matter. I could not declineresponsibility, because it was a matter which concerned the whole country.The Minister for Home Affairs warned me, that this was not the concern of the court of the chiefof staff, because it was not the case of disloyalty but ordinary murder and robbery. I was afraidthat in someone else's hands the judgement would be delayed or even dropped.