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74 PART I: General IssuesBOX 3.2TO DECEIVE OR NOT TO DECEIVE: THAT’S A TOUGH QUESTIONResearchers continue to use deceptive practicesin psychological research (e.g., Sieber, Iannuzzo,& Rodriguez, 1995). The debate in the scientificcommunity concerning the use of deception alsohas not abated (see, for example, Bröder, 1998;Fisher & Fryberg, 1994; Ortmann & Hertwig,1997). It is a complex issue, with those takingpart in the debate sometimes at odds over thedefinition of deception (see Ortmann & Hertwig,1998). Fisher and Fryberg (1994) summarized thedebate as follows: “Ethical arguments have focusedon whether deceptive research practicesare justified on the basis of their potential societalbenefit or violate moral principles of beneficenceand respect for individuals and the fiduciary obligationsof psychologists to research participants”(p. 417). This is quite a mouthful; so let’s breakit down.A moral principle of “beneficence” refers tothe idea that research activities should be beneficent(bring benefits) for individuals and society. Ifdeception is shown to harm individuals or society,then the beneficence of the research can bequestioned. The moral principle of “respect for individuals”is just that: People should be treated aspersons and not “objects” for study, for example.This principle would suggest that people have aright to make their own judgments about the proceduresand purpose of the research in whichthey are participating (Fisher & Fryberg, 1994).“Fiduciary obligations of psychologists” refer tothe responsibilities of individuals who are giventrust over others, even if only temporarily. In thecase of psychological research, the researcher isconsidered to have responsibility for the welfareof participants during the study and for the consequencesof their participation.These ideas and principles can perhaps beillustrated through the arguments of Baumrind(1985), who argues persuasively that “the useof intentional deception in the research settingis unethical, imprudent, and unwarranted scientifically”(p. 165). Specifically, she argues thatthe costs to the participants, to the profession,and to society of the use of deception are toogreat to warrant its continued use. Althoughthese arguments are lengthy and complex, letus attempt a brief summary. First, accordingto Baumrind, deception exacts a cost to participantsbecause it undermines the participants’trust in their own judgment and in a “fiduciary”(someone who is holding something in trust foranother person). When research participants findthey have been duped or tricked, Baumrind believesthis may lead the participants to questionwhat they have learned about themselves and tolead them to distrust individuals (e.g., social scientists)whom they might have previously trustedto provide valid information and advice. A cost tothe profession is exacted because participants(and society at large) soon come to realize thatpsychologists are “tricksters” and not to be believedwhen giving instructions about researchparticipation. If participants tend to suspectpsychologists of lying, then one may questionwhether deception will work as it is intended bythe researcher, a point raised earlier by Kelman(1972). Baumrind also argues that the use ofdeception reveals psychologists are willing tolie, which seemingly contradicts their supposeddedication to seeking truth. Finally, there is harmdone to society because deception underminespeople’s trust in experts and makes them suspiciousin general about all contrived events.Of course, these are not the views of all psychologists(see Christensen, 1988; Kimmel, 1998).Milgram (1977), for instance, suggested that deceptivepractices of psychologists are really akind of “technical illusion” and should be permittedin the interests of scientific inquiry. After all,illusions are sometimes created in real-life situationsin order to make people believe something.When listening to a radio program, people arenot generally bothered by the fact that the thunderthey hear or the sound of a horse gallopingis merely a technical illusion created by a soundeffects specialist. Milgram argues that technicalillusions should be permitted in the case of scientificinquiry. We deceive children into believingin Santa Claus. Why cannot scientists create illusionsin order to help them understand humanbehavior?