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Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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Community-company partnerships (kemitraan) were eventually introduced as a legal mechanism to mitigate<br />

conflict between local communities and concession holders over access to <strong>for</strong>est land and resources. These<br />

partnerships indirectly recognize community claims through the creation of a contract between impacted<br />

communities and the concession-holder. Depending on the contract, communities may receive a share of the<br />

concession‘s revenues, job opportunities, or inputs (e.g., seedlings) and land to manage <strong>for</strong> commercial<br />

purposes. Among the key challenges facing community-company partnerships are direct recognition of<br />

community tenure rights, fairness of the contract, capacity of community institutions to manage benefits, and<br />

rent seeking within the community and company (Purnomo et al., 2007).<br />

Based on the prevalence and long history of concession-style interventions in Indonesia‘s <strong>for</strong>est sector, it is<br />

not surprising that the majority of current <strong>REDD+</strong> projects are taking a similar approach. In particular, most<br />

<strong>REDD+</strong> project developers have applied <strong>for</strong> an Ecosystem Restoration Concession (ERC). The ERC<br />

provides 162 long-term rights (60 years + 35 year extension) to conserve and restore the area, and to generate<br />

revenues from the sale of environmental services. It is considered to be a favorable model among <strong>REDD+</strong><br />

project developers because it allots significant certainty and control over the project‘s future (Madeira, 2009).<br />

The concession model does not explicitly recognize the rights of the local communities that inhabit or use the<br />

<strong>for</strong>est. However, most <strong>REDD+</strong> project developers acknowledge that regardless of legal tenure, local actors<br />

often have de facto control over the <strong>for</strong>est (Madiera, 2009). Thus, engaging and reaching an agreement with<br />

local communities will be critical to the sustainability and permanence of any <strong>REDD+</strong> project. Ministry of<br />

Forestry Decree Number 36 (2009) stipulates that communities should receive 20 percent of carbon revenues<br />

generated by an ERC, to be managed in a community trust fund. However, a recent survey of 23 <strong>REDD+</strong><br />

demonstration projects in Indonesia revealed that only nine projects had plans to provide cash payments to<br />

communities (Morgan, 2010). Instead they are providing non-cash benefits, such as education and health<br />

services, gifts (e.g., laptops or improved cook stoves), employment, and support <strong>for</strong> developing alternative<br />

livelihoods.<br />

Government partnerships:<br />

The Government of Indonesia is the statutory land owner within the <strong>for</strong>est estate. A <strong>REDD+</strong> project<br />

proponent may, there<strong>for</strong>e, enter into an agreement with the government to develop a <strong>REDD+</strong> project and<br />

share the resulting carbon credits. However, the project proponent does not establish its own legal rights to<br />

the land or carbon. Similar to the concession model, proponent-government partnerships do not explicitly<br />

recognize the <strong>for</strong>est tenure rights of local communities. However, there are some existing institutional<br />

arrangements in Indonesia <strong>for</strong> channeling funds from the government to communities <strong>for</strong> development<br />

activities, which may be adaptable <strong>for</strong> <strong>REDD+</strong>.<br />

Most notably, the National Program <strong>for</strong> Community Empowerment (PNPM) channels block grants of<br />

$120,000 to $360,000 US per year from the national budget to the sub-district level. Villages within a subdistrict<br />

compete over access to the funds by engaging in a participatory planning and decision-making process<br />

resulting in self-defined development needs and priorities. Awarded funds are managed by the village<br />

government, with a strong emphasis on transparency and broad-based participation of community members.<br />

Participation of women and poor households is particularly encouraged. Nonetheless, some problems with<br />

elite capture of PNPM funds have been reported. 163 Most PNPM investment has been made in local<br />

infrastructure and service provision. However, starting in 2008, a pilot ―green‖ version of the PNPM is also<br />

being implemented in select locations on Sulawesi and Sumatra islands, focusing on investments in<br />

sustainable natural resource management, conservation, and renewable energy.<br />

162 Established under Ministry of Forestry Decree No. SK 159/Menhut-II/2004 on ―Ecosystem Restoration in Production Forests.‖<br />

163 Interview Samsudin Molano (Head of Mantaya Sabrang Village), interview with Rezal Kusumaatmadja (Starling Resources), and ―Green PNPM:<br />

Evaluation of Sub-Project Implementation Quality.‖ 2011. http://psflibrary.org/catalog/repository/Eval.%20Green%20PNPM%20Sub-<br />

Project%20Implementation%20Quality_May%202011.pdf.<br />

PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 97

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