Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

It is unclear as to whether or not these authorities could be those that are already registered under PFM or
WMA schemes, or if they would need to be other ―aggregates‖ positioned at a different scale. VPO officials
mentioned that PFM and WMAs are good entry points, although it is unclear how much forest is located
within current WMAs.
One issue of concern with regard to aggregate institutions is overhead costs. MNRT/FBD said the
government wants to reduce transaction costs of paying communities—minimize overhead, bureaucracy and
the number of intermediates involved. One option considered by the government to reduce transaction costs
is actually to bypass District government, which is seen as too corrupted and inefficient.
Another option considered is to create large aggregates, since experience shows that those created for WMAs
and CBFM do keep a significant percentage of the benefits for operating costs. This option is supported by
some NGOs, such as the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), which prefers to support ―super-associations‖
of more than 20 villages. However, several studies have shown that larger aggregates are less accountable to
village members (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007). Maintaining ethnic homogeneity within each
aggregate also seems to be a success factor in WMA governance (these issues will be described in more details
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4).
The VPO mentioned that the REDD+ pilot projects currently conducted in Tanzania will provide lessons on
benefit sharing. A consultant will be hired to bring the lessons together and prepare a report on benefitsharing
(Phase 2 of the REDD+ Task Force).
3.3 THE CASE OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS AS
ILLUSTRATED BY ENDUIMET WMA
Although WMAs are designed to manage wildlife rather than forests, 93 they are mentioned in the REDD+
national strategy and by many as a model that can be utilized for developing local institutions for REDD+
benefit sharing mechanisms.
The first pilot WMAs were established in 2003 and are now generating revenue at the village level. WMAs,
therefore, provide useful, although still recent, experiences of local-level fund management. The scale 94 of
aggregate institutions created to manage WMAs, called ―Authorized Authorities‖ (AAs), could present
advantages to minimize REDD+ transaction costs and to limit leakage issues. Lessons can be learned from
successes but also from pitfalls experienced with WMAs. For example, a wealth of studies have highlighted
the lack of capacity of AAs and village governments, flaws in WMA regulations, and the lack of political will
to transfer effective management power to communities.
3.3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ENDUIMET WMA
The Enduimet WMA lies in the West Kilimanjaro Basin, among the Amboseli, Arusha, and Kilimanjaro
parks, in the Longido District (see map below). This WMA was among the 16 pilots launched in 2003 after
the WMA Regulation of 2002 was passed. It included nine villages at the time it acquired wildlife user rights
in August, 2007. The constitution of this WMA was facilitated by AWF following a wildlife survey conducted
by elephant researchers and district wildlife authorities (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007).
One of the villages with the largest amount of wildlife and territory, Sinya, refused to join the WMA for
several years as it already earned revenues through contracts signed with a safari operator and anticipated that
93 For more information on the legal background of WMAs, refer to Landesa‘ Carbon Right case study.
94 In terms of the number of villages grouped.
PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 49