Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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FIGURE 2.3: TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR REDD+ IN DRC–FINANCIAL FLOWS International National Subnational /local National preparedness programs Public financing (ODA, funds, …) Private financing (carbon markets, direct investments) Foreign Aid Firms, NGOs National REDD fund Provincial preparedness programs Local projects Payments to local level made either directly or through local institutions (e.g., National Forest Fund, Social fund) Based on Cadre de mise en œuvre intérimaire de la REDD+ en RDC : Vue d’ensemble et Propositions, note prepared by the NC-REDD, March 2, 2011. More uncertainty remains regarding what revenue distribution rule will apply to carbon revenue generated on untitled land. For example, would a local community be subject to the same taxation system for carbon revenue generated on land held under customary tenure? The current Land Law (of 1973) does not provide any answer to this question. However, its revision is underway and might provide more clarity in regards to non-forested areas. In forested areas, the 2002 Code and implementing regulation on community forest concessions will enable communities to register forests under their customary tenure as ―community concessions‖. Article 37 in the draft Arrêté 68 explicitly exempts revenues from payment for ecosystem services and conservation from any taxation and stipulates that revenues generated by REDD+ projects on community concessions will be allocated to a ―community development fund.‖ However, the procedure to create community forest concessions is relatively complex 69 and will require external support from NGOs and local administration. Experiences in other countries with similar legislation show that it will likely take years for community concessions to be created. In the meantime, it is less clear how local communities will benefit from REDD+ projects carried out on their land (held under customary tenure) that is located outside community concessions. The Ibi-Batéké 68 Final draft (as of June 2011) of the Arrêté Ministériel portant dispositions relatives à la gestion des forêts des communautés locales et à la tenure des forêts villageoises. 69 To exploit their concession, communities have to create three local institutions (Community Council, Management Committee, and an Oversight Committee presided by a local administrative official), to establish a forest management plan that includes an inventory, participatory mapping, and land use plan. In addition, commercial logging permits have to be approved and granted by provincial authorities annually (Articles 9 to 17 of the abovementioned Arrêté). 28 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER Initial investments (Phase 2) Payments REDD+ UNCCC (Phase 3) Carbon market payments (Phase 3) Public financing Private financing Public financing Private financing
project, the first to be registered as a CDM project, is widely used as a reference in REDD+ discussions, as it illustrates a project launched by a private company, on non-forested areas, where customary tenure was not perceived to be secure. This project is presented in Section 2.3 of this document. To ensure REDD+ projects carried out by outside organizations (firms, NGOs) do benefit local communities, including those lacking clear tenure, the NC-REDD+ is proposing that the official registration of REDD+ projects be conditional upon their ability to demonstrate that they respect internationally recognized social standards (e.g., Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standards [CCBA]). In a draft version of the official REDD+ procedures shared in May, 2011, the NC-REDD+ would require that REDD+ projects demonstrate that local communities and indigenous people gave their full, prior and informed consent to the project, and that they signed an agreement on benefit-sharing with those who are developing the projects. The use of social agreements is also supported by many Congolese NGOs, who propose to follow the model recently created for logging concessions. The implementation of this model has just begun in DRC (the implementation regulation was adopted in June 2010). This model of social agreements is presented in further detail in Section 2.4. BOX 2.3: REVENUE-SHARING RULE ESTABLISHED BY THE 2006 CONSTITUTION AND THE 2002 FOREST CODE The 2006 Constitution, Article 175, establishes that 40 percent of national revenue collected by provincial governments is kept at the Province level (40 percent of which is allocated to subprovincial government entities), and 60 percent is transferred to central government. The Constitution does not regulate how these funds should be used at the Province level, and the practice has been that they have been allocated to cover government and administration operational costs. This disposition of the Constitution has not been fully applied yet, as the Treasury (central government) has continued to centralize collection of revenues generated by exploitation of forests and mining through export taxes. In addition to this constitutional provision, the 2002 Forest Code introduced two important innovations specific to the forestry sector: � 40 percent of the annual area tax on logging concessions is transferred from the Treasury to the Provinces where the concessions are located, with the specific mandate to use these funds for public interest works and infrastructure (Forest Code, Article 122); and � Industrial logging companies are required to sign with local communities adjacent to their concessions a negotiated social agreement, indicating what benefits and services the companies will provide to the communities, such as roads, health and education centers, or transportation services (Forest Code, Article 89 and Arrêté 028 establishing a model for social agreements). A similar provision is included in the Mining Code (unlike the oil and gas sector where benefits to communities are negotiated on a contract basis without any legal requirement). 2.3 ILLUSTRATION OF A PROJECT-BASED BENEFIT-SHARING ARRANGEMENT: THE IBI-BATÉKÉ PROJECT The Ibi estate is located on the Batéké Plateau, approximately 150 kilometers from the capital Kinshasa. It is part of the village of Mbankana, Maluku municipality. The Batéké plateau is 90 percent covered with PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 29
Page 1 and 2: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
Page 3: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
Page 6 and 7: 3.0 TANZANIA ......................
Page 8 and 9: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AA Autho
Page 10 and 11: IUPHHK Timber Resources Utilization
Page 12 and 13: PREFACE The Institutional Mechanism
Page 14 and 15: 3. Increasing experience in Payment
Page 16 and 17: BOX 1.1: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
Page 18 and 19: � Risk of deforestation; � Prop
Page 20 and 21: Priority Ecosystems (INEGI classifi
Page 22 and 23: Overview of key institutions and ac
Page 24 and 25: It appears that this project is rel
Page 26 and 27: deliberate, and continuous outreach
Page 28 and 29: � Additional reforestation: Befor
Page 30 and 31: elected as assistants to members of
Page 32 and 33: MEXICO CASE STUDY APPENDIX 1.1: LIS
Page 34 and 35: Today, the DRC is the most-advanced
Page 36 and 37: 2.2.1 WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF REDD+ B
Page 38 and 39: to be harmonized with the 2006 Cons
Page 42 and 43: herbaceous or shrubby savanna that
Page 44 and 45: comprised of the 18 clan chiefs wit
Page 46 and 47: NOVACEL staff and supporters is tha
Page 48 and 49: 2.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES As mentioned
Page 50 and 51: These institutions are in essence p
Page 52 and 53: The institutional model for social
Page 54 and 55: In the case of logging concessions,
Page 56 and 57: DRC CASE STUDY APPENDIX 2.1: LIST O
Page 58 and 59: sharing. First, consultations with
Page 60 and 61: emissions). There is also the quest
Page 62 and 63: the village would earn less through
Page 64 and 65: 3.3.2 FUNDING SOURCES Revenues star
Page 66 and 67: village went from earning $50,000 U
Page 68 and 69: hunting quotas set too high by the
Page 70 and 71: Suledo Forest lies in the Kiteto Di
Page 72 and 73: The ZEC aims to acquire rights to m
Page 74 and 75: 3.4.7 EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANC
Page 76 and 77: 3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME
Page 78 and 79: incentives for populations to engag
Page 80 and 81: � The size and composition of agg
Page 82 and 83: Type of organization Organization n
Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF NEPAL AND LOCATIO
Page 86 and 87: improved tenure security, enhanced
Page 88 and 89: ―distant users‖). Presumably, t
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which are housed in the district of
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This demonstration project has been
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significant backlog of unapproved O
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Monitoring and Verification: A moni
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management. REDD+ simply provides a
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initially be directed towards a par
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5.0 INDONESIA 5.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT S
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REDD), and the Forest Investment Pr
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FIGURE 5.3: THREE IMPLEMENTATION PH
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TABLE 5.1: BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION ACC
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Land user partnerships: A REDD+ pro
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� Learn lessons and build capacit
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identifies the owner and boundaries
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carried out by Yayasan Puter will f
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5.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES The RUPES pro
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Monitoring and verification: HKm gr
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provided by Yayasan Puter was not e
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emission reductions. However, emerg
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REFERENCES Almeida, F. & Hatcher, J
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Graf, S. & Iglesias, L. 2010. Pago
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REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change C
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U.S. Agency for International Devel
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