Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

In the case of logging concessions, this passivity has often created unrealistically high expectations among
communities. Villagers can see the wealth of the company (through equipment, salaries to their staff, clothes,
etc.) and many stories circulate on how much money they make selling the wood they harvested. The colonial
past is still present and contributes to the distrust between villagers and logging companies.
Equity:
Equity of benefit-sharing within communities seems to be a secondary issue, as both Ibi-Batéké project and
the model of social agreements require that all funds be invested in ―community projects‖ that by definition
should benefit all villagers equally. Opportunities for elite capture seem to be limited in the case of Ibi-Batéké,
as all benefits are managed by an external organization controlled by NOVACEL. More experience with
FDLs will be needed to assess how egalitarian these institutions will be.
2.5.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The NC-REDD+ and NGOs are still in the process of identifying options for REDD+ benefit-sharing.
Their perceptions are evolving quickly as they work to translate concepts into practical solutions. It is,
therefore, too early to make specific recommendations on institutional mechanisms for benefit-sharing. This
sub-section, therefore, attempts to identify the main advantages and drawbacks of the two main strategic
options currently considered in DRC.
A general belief of government officials and NGOs interviewed is that REDD+ benefits flowing to
communities should not come in the form of cash payments. Communities are considered to be unable to
manage cash and not likely to acquire this capacity in the short term due to a lack of basic education,
geographic isolation, and lack of access to information.
There are important strategic consequences to this perception. If decision-makers perceive that it will take too
much time for communities to acquire money management skills, then they will likely try to by-pass this
problem and regulate the type of benefits that can reach populations. Although this approach might limit
opportunities for elite capture in the short term, it might also prevent populations from gaining the skills that
they will need in the long term (including money management skills).
Efficiency vs. communities’ control of benefit-sharing decisions:
Along these lines, ongoing discussions in the DRC on REDD+ benefit-sharing seem polarized between
efficiency vs. communities‘ right to (some) control over benefit-sharing decisions.
The case of the Ibi-Batéké project illustrates how REDD+ projects would be carried out most efficiently by
bypassing the major problem of communities‘ capacity and keeping their expectations low by concentrating
all benefit management responsibilities in the hands of project staff. However, this case study also noted
problems with this model that might undermine the country‘s capacity to meet carbon sequestration
objectives:
� Concentration of power and rights in the hand of intermediary agencies: Communities remain passive recipients with
limited-to-no bargaining power. Land use changes required to reduce deforestation and forest
degradation are less likely to be sustainable when communities do not develop ownership of projects
promoting these changes.
� Limited community capacity-building: The current system maintains communities in a situation of dependence
and might even weaken community-level institutions in the long run. Strong community institutions,
however, are necessary for communities to self-regulate land and forest use patterns.
� Limited scalability: the success of the project relies heavily on the personal wealth, skills, and connections
of Olivier Mushiete.
42 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER